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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Gendered Risks, Poverty, and Vulnerability 
Case Study of the Raskin Food Subsidy Program in Indonesia 
Sirojuddin Arif, Muhammad Syukri, Rebecca Holmes, Vita Febriany 
Overseas Development Institute and SMERU Research Institute 
 
 
This study investigates gender dimensions of risks and the extent to which such risks are 
addressed in Indonesia’s social protection policy. It is structured around the following four 
areas: understanding the diversity of gendered economic and social risks; a gender analysis of 
social protection policy and design; effects of social protection on gender equality, food 
security and poverty/vulnerability reduction at the community, household and individual level; 
and implications for future policy and programming to improve social protection effectiveness. 
The study employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, including desk review, key 
informant interviews, a household questionnaire, focus group discussion and life histories. 
Based on data collected in two research sites, Tapanuli Tengah of North Sumatra province 
and Timor Tengah Selatan of East Nusa Tenggara province, the study found that, despite its 
prevalence, attention to gender inequality has been minimal in social protection policy. This 
owes particularly to lack of awareness of and commitment to gender issues among 
policymakers. In food security in particular, gender insensitivity results fundamentally from 
program design, which does not take into account women’s specific vulnerabilities in food 
access. The program has relatively equal impacts on men and women but has no significant 
impacts in relation to reducing specific risks and vulnerabilities facing women. 
 
Keywords: Gender, social protection, risks, food insecurity, food subsidy, Indonesia 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This study is part of a larger research project that involved a number of different countries in 
Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Latin America (Mexico and Peru), South Asia (Bangladesh and 
India) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Vietnam). All the research partners had the same 
goal of assessing the gender dimensions of social protection programming as well as its 
impacts on people’s well-being. This report specifically examines the gendered dimensions and 
impacts of the Indonesian subsidized food program, Raskin (Rice for Poor Households), 
which have until now been under-researched.  
 
Research was conducted in four research sites in two districts: Tapanuli Tengah and Timor 
Tengah Selatan. The research methodology involved a mixed methods approach of qualitative 
and quantitative work. This included a desk review, key informant interviews, a household 
questionnaire, focus group discussions (FGDs) and life histories. Conceptually, the study 
aimed to understand the importance of gendered social and economic risks, especially gender 
inequality, to support more effective social protection programming to address poverty, 
vulnerability and food insecurity.  
 
The literature on economic and social vulnerabilities shows that limited employment 
opportunities and inadequate pay, among others, constitute major causes of economic 
vulnerability for Indonesian women. Women’s employment opportunities are significantly 
fewer than those for male workers. This is partly a result of the country’s national 
development strategy, which does not accommodate women’s interests. Indonesia’s 
transformation from agriculture to a mixed economy of agriculture and modern industry has 
put female workers in a marginal position. In the informal sector, where most female workers 
are concentrated, women often have to work in marginal sectors such as domestic work or in 
high-risk jobs like sex work. Furthermore, women receive lower wages. Pirmana (2006) noted 
that female workers received only 71.2% to 76.7% of the wages received by their male 
counterparts in 1999–2004. Women’s lower position is much more apparent if we also take 
into account violations of female workers’ rights in the labor market or the workplace.  
 
In relation to food insecurity in particular, evidence indicates that, despite Indonesia’s growth 
during the most recent food and financial crises, child malnutrition cases have been rising. 
Among these cases, 28% of children are underweight and more than 44% are stunted. 
 
Gender inequality is also driven by social and cultural factors. In many instances, social 
inequality between men and women has further worsened inequality of access to economic 
resources. For instance, women’s domestic responsibilities, which are one of the most 
common social risks facing women, often hinder them from active participation in the labor 
market. Meanwhile, discriminatory practices against women, such as inheritance systems that 
give land ownership only to men or prioritization of boys over girls in education, may also 
contribute to the lower position of women. Another risk lies in women’s lack of access to 
decision making at state, community and household level. Even on issues closely related to 
women’s interests, like health and child delivery, it is often men who make the final decision. 
Last but not least, many traditional views on gender relations and women in particular, which 
often prioritize men over women, remain in place and affect public attitudes towards women. 
In the workplace, for instance, a number of labels, to some degree derived from cultural views 
on women, have negative effects on women’s position or wages. Some women also suffer 
from domestic violence and sexual abuse.  
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Out of these two types of risks, namely, economic and social risks, people are more cognisant 
of the former. As such, most coping strategies are taken to tackle problems considered 
economic. In Tapanuli Tengah, taking loans from local stalls or relatives or neighbors and 
undertaking additional paid jobs are the main coping strategies for the poor. Poor people in 
Timor Tengah Selatan have more options, ranging from undertaking more paid jobs, to sale of 
assets, to relying on government assistance.  
  
Unfortunately, policymakers have also neglected social risks. Understandings of social risks, 
and of gender inequality in particular, have not been effectively integrated into social 
protection policy and programming in Indonesia. Social protection policy has been very 
much influenced by the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. Most of 
the efforts made to develop social protection policy since then have focused on the 
provision of social assistance, such as food subsidies, cash transfers, school assistance and 
health insurance for the poor. Some promotional measures, such as community 
development, have brought attention to the lack of employment opportunities. Nevertheless, 
policy has generally been shaped by the idea of mitigating the adverse impacts of economic 
shocks. Transformation of unequal social relations that may hinder people’s movement out 
of poverty, including gender inequality, has not been adequately included. However, there 
are some important exceptions, such as the education stipend for girls, women’s 
participation in community-led social protection activities and the recent conditional cash 
transfer (PKH), which integrates gender considerations to some extent by targeting mothers 
or adult women in the family and pregnant women and those with children under 15 years, 
and also including antenatal and reproductive health care among the conditions with which 
program beneficiaries need to comply. 
  
Despite a number of laws that strongly encourage gender equality, as well as ratification of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
by the government in 1984 and Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on gender mainstreaming, lack 
of awareness of and commitment to gender equality is apparent among policymakers. 
Interviews with key informants indicated that this results primarily from the influence of 
cultural norms or practices that belittle the role of women. A number of new laws to enhance 
gender equality are more or less ignored when they cross cultural practices, which are often 
taken for granted. Second, the role of women focal points, including the Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment, has been minimal in enforcing the integration of gender into social protection 
as well as government policy in general. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that 
gender mainstreaming is not effective at local level. In spite of the central government’s 
instruction to establish women’s empowerment agencies at every sub-national level, it appears 
that gender mainstreaming is not given due importance at local level, and there is concern that 
local governments lack the capacity and priority to collect sex-disaggregated data. 
 
In the case of the food subsidy in particular, the Raskin program has not taken into account 
women’s specific vulnerabilities in terms of food insecurity. Evidence shows that, in Indonesia, 
women’s specific interests in food security entail the problems of child and maternal under-
nutrition. Such issues are not considered in the food subsidy program—malnutrition is 
generally handled regionally, with interventions concentrated in certain areas where the 
number of children with malnutrition is high. In practice, the fact that little attention has been 
given to gender dimensions has led to a lack of attention to the concerns of women or groups 
of women, such as widows or female heads of household. In the disbursement process, 
women’s participation is minimal. Their role is limited to taking rice, not taking part in the 
decision-making process. 
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Regarding the gendered impacts of the program, the benefits of Raskin are shared by all 
members of the household, often with a larger part given to the children. Other indirect 
effects for children are noticed, for example increased investment in children’s education as 
parents may save some money because of the cheaper price of Raskin rice. Our research 
found no gender discrimination in the allocation of Raskin rice and in expenditure on 
children’s education: the benefits are shared equally between men and women, boys and girls. 
However, as gender needs may differ between men and women, it is also important to take 
these into account. In relation to food security in particular, women’s roles and responsibilities 
in managing household food, as well as their specific vulnerability to food insecurity (e.g., 
during pregnancy), have important effects on child under-nutrition—problems that are not 
adequately considered by food subsidy programs like Raskin. Therefore, the fact that the 
benefits of Raskin are shared equally by men and women does not necessarily indicate positive 
impacts of the program in terms of gender equality. 
 
However, a number of entry points exist to strengthen the gender sensitivity of the program’s 
design and implementation, including promoting women’s participation in program 
governance structures (community meetings), strengthening the focus on existing gendered 
vulnerabilities in terms of food insecurity and under-nutrition and especially drawing attention 
to lifecycle vulnerabilities (pregnancy and nursing, young children), as well as supporting 
linkages with ongoing gender mainstreaming tools such as collecting and analyzing sex-
disaggregated data and gender budgeting to support gender-sensitive programming. 
 
Just as important is the need to recognize the limitations of Raskin as an effective tool for 
food security. Evidence clearly demonstrates that women’s vulnerability to poverty and food 
security needs to be addressed by measures such as securing women’s employment 
opportunities, addressing wage disparities to increase incomes and supporting agricultural 
production. In this way, there is a need to think strategically about the links between food 
subsidy programs and other programs that may have greater opportunities to support progress 
towards women’s empowerment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
There is growing consensus among researchers that gender matters in poverty reduction. 
Gender inequality appears to influence not only the possibility of people becoming poor but 
also how men and women experience poverty. First, more women than men live in poverty: 
according to Cornwall et al. (cited in Holmes and Jones, 2009), women constitute 70% of the 
world’s poor. Second, experiences of living in poverty vary between men and women, even 
within the same household. The widely accepted notion that resources are not shared equally 
among household members only confirms this, and in general women suffer more than men. 
Traditional divisions of labor often lead to women having to work longer hours, bearing the 
double burden of working and caring for other household members (Gondowarsito, 2002). 
This can be exacerbated in times of shock or crisis. Based on a longitudinal study that took 
place in Cirebon both before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, Breman and 
Wiradi (2004) found that women were more severely affected by crisis both economically and 
socially. Cross-country observation reveals that food crises often lead to women having to 
bear more of a burden, as they are usually the ones who have responsibility for food in the 
household (Holmes et al., 2009). 
 
In line with this argument, gender analysis is needed in any poverty reduction program—including 
social protection—so as to ensure effectiveness in terms of achieving the stated objectives. 
Without a clear understanding of the gender differences of the issue at hand, it is difficult for 
programs to reach poor women and to address gender inequality. Gender-blind programs may end 
up with limited benefits for women, or even be counterproductive in terms of women’s 
empowerment (Noerdin, 2006). A clear example is given by a number of government programs 
on women, such as Family Welfare Empowerment (PKK). Despite PKK’s stated objective to 
empower women, a focus on improving women’s capacities to handle domestic tasks meant that 
PKK did not acknowledge the specific problems facing rural women, and at the same time 
reinforced women’s domestic responsibilities (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 1992). 
 
The importance of social protection programming in Indonesia increased significantly as a 
result of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis: the introduction of programs was a key policy 
response to the rising poverty and food insecurity levels caused by the crisis. Such programs 
have grown and been modified into a broader social protection package over the past decade 
(Appendix 1). Social protection policy in Indonesia covers a number of programs, geared 
mainly towards income security—and to some extent food security—for the poor, through 
targeted cash transfers, food subsidies and supporting households’ investment in human 
capital through education scholarships and subsidies. There have been positive effects on 
poverty reduction, especially during the crisis (Sumarto et al., 2008), but gender sensitivity 
varies from one program to another. How far these social protection programs have really 
addressed gendered risks and vulnerabilities remains a big question, and so far little attention 
has been paid to answering it. 
 
With a focus on social protection, this report investigates the gender dimensions and impacts of 
the Raskin (Rice for the Poor) subsidized food program and assesses the extent to which gender 
inequality has been addressed in the program’s design and implementation. The gender aspect of 
the program has been under-researched, even though women have a significant role to play in 
maintaining household food security. Traditional gender rules define that it is women, not men, 
who bear the responsibility for cooking household food, for example. 
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1.2 Methodology 
 
The research methodology involved a mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative 
work, structured around the following four areas: 
1. Understanding the diversity of gendered economic and social risks; 
2. Gender analysis of social protection policy and design; 
3. Effects of the social protection program on gender equality, food security and 
poverty/vulnerability reduction at the community, household and intrahousehold level; 
4. Implications for future policy and program design to improve social protection 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Research was conducted in four research areas in two districts: Tapanuli Tengah and Timor 
Tengah Selatan. The former is located in the western part of the country, in North Sumatra 
province, and the latter is located in East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur) province, a 
poor region in the eastern part of Indonesia. There is evidence that the western part of 
Indonesia is generally more food secure than the eastern part (as well as benefiting more from 
economic development) (Table 1). As such, a comparison of cases from each region may 
generate a better understanding not only of issues related to food insecurity in the country but 
also how social protection (and food security programs in particular) has worked so far and 
may be adapted to different localities. The fieldwork was conducted in two villages in each 
district, drawing on a matched purposive sampling technique which considered their 
similarities in terms of poverty ranking in order to ensure their comparability.  
 
Table 1. Research Areas in Brief 
 Tapanuli Tengah Timor Tengah Selatan 
Poverty levela  24%  67%  
Gender Development Index (GDI)b  58.4  38.1  
GDI rankingb 135  334  
Food insecurityc  Priority 3 (Scale 6) Priority 1 (Scale 6)  
Culture (as relevant to gender)  Patrilineal  Belis (marriage tradition) 
Ethnic background  Batak  Timorese  
Food security program (Raskin)  Yes  Yes  
Conditional cash transfer (PKH) coverage  Yes  Yes  
Rural/urban Rural—semi-urban Rural—semi-urban  
Agro-ecological characteristics  Mountainous  Dry climate  
Malnutrition rates (% children (<5) underweightc 35≤45  ≥45  
aSuryahadi et al., 2005. 
bBPS et al., 2004. 
cFood Security Board Indonesia and WFP, 2005. 
 
With regard to data collection, the study employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Overview of Research Methodology 
Methodology Details 
Desk review  Secondary data and program document analysis 
Key informant 
interviews  
National (policymakers, donors, international agencies, civil society, researchers); 
subnational (government and nongovernment implementers)  
Household 
questionnaire  A total of 103 households   
Focus group 
discussions  Eight FGDs with beneficiaries, four with females and four with males 
Life histories  16 life histories (eight men and eight women) at different life/social stages: adolescence; married; single household heads (divorced, abandoned or widowed); elderly   
 
 
The main objectives of the desk review were: to map key gender-specific vulnerabilities in the 
country; to identify how gender is (or is not) already discussed and integrated within the 
context of policies and programs at national level; to carry out a gender audit/mapping of the 
main programs and the extent to which they integrate gender considerations; and to 
contextualize Raskin within the country’s broader national social protection framework and 
related policy debates. 
 
Using semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interviews were carried out at the 
national level in October 2009 to provide a broader understanding of social protection design 
decision-making processes and to explore the political economy dimensions of the integration 
of gender into policies and programs. At subnational level, key informant interviews with 
implementing agencies aimed at generating a better understanding of the key challenges in 
implementing social protection at the local level, and the implications/impacts of these 
challenges on households and individuals. 
 
During the household survey, program beneficiaries were asked to identify two main 
quantifiable trends: (i) the dominant vulnerabilities and risks among households below the 
poverty line and the extent to which these risks are gendered and generational; and (ii) 
household and individual coping strategies in the face of the above risks, including both 
informal and formal social protection mechanisms. FGDs were then used to tease out the 
details of the social protection effects – both direct and indirect – at the individual, household, 
and community levels. 
 
Finally, the use of life histories (with beneficiaries who represented different life/social stages, 
from adolescence to old age) allowed for a more in-depth exploration of individuals’ gendered 
experiences of risk and vulnerability, and the individual, household, community and policy 
factors that shape available coping/resilience strategies. They also provided insights into the 
relative importance of the Raskin program in diverse individuals’ lives. 
 
 
1.3 Report Overview 
  
The report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual framework that 
underpins the analysis, highlighting the importance of understanding gendered economic and 
social risks at the individual, household and community levels. Chapter 3 maps out the 
patterning of gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities in the Indonesian context and Chapter 4 
discusses the extent to which these are reflected in social protection policy and programming. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the Raskin program and the extent to which gender has been integrated 
into its design and implementation. Chapter 6 then turns to an analysis of our fieldwork 
findings on the effects of Raskin on gender dynamics at the individual, household and 
community levels. Chapter 7 explores the drivers of program impacts. Finally, Chapter 8 
concludes and highlights key policy implications of our findings. 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GENDERED ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL RISKS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION 
RESPONSES1 
 
 
This conceptual framework aims to identify sources of risk and vulnerability at individual, 
household and community levels which contribute to food insecurity and poverty, and to 
assess the extent to which social protection responses are sensitive to gender-specific risks and 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 
2.1 Food Security 
 
Food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life. Food security is achieved through three essential components: 
availability, access and utilization (preparation and consumption of food and the biological 
capacity of individuals to absorb and utilize nutrients in the food that they eat). 
  
The concept of food security can be applied at various levels, from the global to the individual. 
Approaches often address the links between sustainable development, poverty reduction and 
the promotion of food security through policies and programs at the macro, meso and micro 
level. This can include: ensuring that agricultural trade is conducive to fostering food security 
for all through an open market-oriented world trade system; promoting rural development, 
including sustainable agricultural, fishery and forestry production and management of natural 
resources; enhancing women’s access to agricultural credit, natural resources, technology and 
information; and ensuring that children and other vulnerable groups can adequately access and 
utilize food. 
 
Our conceptual framework focuses on issues of food security at household and individual 
level.2 At household level, food security is linked to household capacity to ensure a sustainable 
livelihood and to provide food, protection and care. This is highly dependent on 
intrahousehold dynamics, household composition, power relations and individuals’ bargaining 
power. Women’s empowerment, education levels and status within the household are strongly 
correlated with outcomes in health, nutrition, and food security. Our framework therefore 
draws particular attention to gender and age differences in access and utilization (e.g., 
household income and access to food, intrahousehold resource allocation, health and nutrition 
status of children) and examines the mechanisms by which social protection can strengthen 
individual and household food security, directly or indirectly.   
 
 
2.2 Social Protection 
 
Social protection, commonly defined as encompassing a subset of interventions for the poor— 
carried out formally by the state (often with donor or international nongovernment organization 
(INGO) financing and support) or the private sector, or informally through community or inter- 
and intrahousehold support networks—is an increasingly important approach to reduce 
                                                 
1This chapter is based on Holmes and Jones (2009). 
2This is based on our research project proposal. 
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vulnerability and chronic poverty, especially in contexts of crisis. To date, however, the focus 
has been mainly on economic risks and vulnerability—such as income and consumption shocks 
and stresses—with only limited attention to social risks. Social risks, however—such as gender 
inequality, social discrimination, unequal distributions of resources and power at the 
intrahousehold level and limited citizenship—are often just as important, if not more important, 
in pushing households into poverty and keeping them there. Indeed, of the five poverty traps 
identified by the 2008–2009 Chronic Poverty Report, four are nonincome measures: insecurity 
(ranging from insecure environments to conflict and violence); limited citizenship (a lack of a 
meaningful political voice); spatial disadvantage (exclusion from politics, markets, resources, etc., 
owing to geographical remoteness); and social discrimination (which traps people in exploitative 
relationships of power and patronage) (CPRC, 2008). 
 
Drawing on Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s (2004) framework of social protection, the 
objectives of the full range of social protection interventions fall under four headings: 
protective, preventive, promotive, and transformative. 
 
The objectives of the first three relate to: reducing income poverty and enhancing real 
incomes and economic productivity; improving household food security; and protecting or 
increasing investment in human capital through income-based approaches. Protective 
measures seek to smooth consumption and income; preventive measures aim to prevent 
households falling (further) into poverty in the advent of a shock or stress; and promotive 
measures aim to support households to invest in productive activities, enhancing real incomes 
and capabilities. 
 
The transformative mechanism of the framework aims to address concerns of social equity 
and exclusion. Importantly, this ‘political’ or ‘transformative’ view extends social protection to 
arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
It is argued that a comprehensive social protection approach combining mechanisms to 
achieve all four objectives (or with explicit linkages to complementary interventions with these 
objectives) will best achieve the goals of reducing poverty and vulnerability (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Conceptualizing Social Protection 
 
Box 1. Conceptualizing Social Protection 
In Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s (2004) framework of social protection, the objectives of the full range 
of social protection interventions are fourfold:  
• Protective: Providing relief from deprivation (e.g., disability benefits or noncontributory pensions); 
• Preventive: Averting deprivation (e.g., through savings clubs, insurance, or risk diversification);   
• Promotive: Enhancing real incomes and capabilities (e.g., through inputs transfers); and  
• Transformative: Addressing concerns of social equity and exclusion by expanding social protection to 
arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights, rather than confining 
the scope of social protection to respond to economic risks alone through targeted income and 
consumption transfers. 
 
Social protection refers to a set of instruments (formal and informal) that provide:   
• Social assistance (e.g., regular and predictable cash or in-kind transfers, including fee waivers, public 
works schemes, food aid);  
• Social services targeted to marginalized groups (e.g., family counseling, juvenile justice services, 
family violence prevention, and protection);   
• Social insurance to protect people against risks of shocks (typically health, employment, and 
environmental);  
• Social equity measures (e.g., rights awareness campaigns, skills training) to protect against social 
risks such as discrimination and abuse.  
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2.3 The Gender Dimensions of Economic and Social Risks  
 
Poor households typically face a range of risks, which include political, environmental, 
economic and social risks. Vulnerability to risk, and its opposite or alternative, resilience, are 
both strongly linked to the capacity of individuals or households to prevent, mitigate or cope 
with such risks. Vulnerability is influenced by individual and household demography, age, 
dependency ratios, location, social capital, ownership of assets and access to resources. Both 
economic risks (including the economic impact of environmental and natural risks) and social 
risks are influenced by gender dynamics and may have important differential impacts on men 
and women. Because they are socially constructed, gender roles and responsibilities are highly 
varied, and infused with power relations (WHO, 2007). Figure 1 maps out the ways in which 
economic and social risks can be reinforced or mediated from the macro to the micro level 
through, for example, policy interventions, discriminatory practices embedded in institutions 
(e.g., social exclusion and discrimination in the labor market) and community, household, and 
individual capacities and agency. Opportunities to enhance the integration of gender at each of 
these levels are highly context specific, and depend on the balance between formal and 
informal social protection mechanisms within a country as well as on the profile of the 
government agencies responsible for the design and implementation of formal mechanisms.  
 
Vulnerability to economic and social risks are intertwined—understanding this intersection is 
critical to social protection program design and implementation in order to be effective in 
reducing poverty and improving food security. Meanwhile, although a number of social 
protection initiatives have to varying degrees addressed gendered social and economic risks, 
this has often been uneven and informed by narrow understandings of gender relations. For 
example, social assistance and public works programs often target women, informed by 
arguments that the involvement of women in development leads to greater program 
effectiveness and investment of additional income in family well-being. Food subsidy 
programs (such as the Raskin program in Indonesia) often target the household as a unit, 
although the intrahousehold allocation of food is often unequal, discriminating against women 
and girls. To be effective, social protection programs require more than a narrow focus on 
women beneficiaries, that is, not only shaping the type of risk that is tackled but also 
influencing program impacts at the community and household levels.  
 
2.3.1 Gendered Economic Risks 
 
Economic risks can include declines in national financial resources and/or aid flows, terms of 
trade shocks or environmental disasters. Stresses might include long-term national budget 
deficits and debt, lack of a regulatory framework and/or enforcement of health and safety 
standards at work and lack of an economically enabling environment. Given men’s and 
women’s differential engagement in the economy (i.e. the labor market), the impacts of 
macroeconomic shocks are highly gendered. For example, in times of economic crisis, women 
are often the first to lose jobs in the formal sector, such as in Korea during the financial crisis 
of 1997/98 (World Bank, 2009). In other parts of East Asia, including Indonesia and the 
Philippines, women gained in overall employment because of their lower wages and lower 
levels of union organisation (World Bank, 2009). Cuts in public expenditure are also likely to 
affect women more (in many contexts) because they tend to have greater responsibility for 
household health and education access. The effects on men and male identities of economic 
malaise are also increasingly recognized. Silberschmidt (2001), for instance, highlights the way 
in which rising unemployment and low incomes are undermining male breadwinner roles and 
resulting in negative coping strategies, such as sexually aggressive behaviour and gender-based 
violence, in a bid to reassert traditional masculine identities.  
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Figure 1. Impact pathways of vulnerability to economic and social risks 
Source: Holmes and Jones, 2009. 
The SMERU Research Institute 9
At the meso or community level, the impacts of economic shocks are mediated by, for 
example, gender-segmented labor markets and institutional rules and norms (e.g. absence of 
affirmative action to address historical discrimination of women and marginalized social 
groups), which lead to poor access and utilization of productive services by women. Women 
in general have less access to credit, inputs (such as fertilizer), extension services and, 
therefore, improved technologies (World Bank, 2009), which undermines their resilience to 
cope with stress and shocks. 
  
How poor households are able to cope with and mitigate the impacts of shocks and ongoing 
stresses also depends on a number of factors at the micro or intrahousehold level. Household 
members’ vulnerability is shaped by household composition (e.g., dependency ratios, sex of 
the household head, number of boys and girls in the household), individual and household 
ownership and control of assets (land, labor, financial capital, livestock, time and so on), 
access to labor markets, social networks and social capital and levels of education. Women 
typically have lower levels of education, less access to and ownership and control of 
productive assets and different social networks to men, leading to lower economic 
productivity and income generation and weaker bargaining positions in the household. In 
times of crisis, moreover, underlying gender biases may mean that women’s or female-headed 
households’ assets are more vulnerable to stripping than those of men, the impact of which 
may be lengthy if what has been sold cannot be replaced. Women’s bargaining position and 
entitlements may also be reduced more rapidly than those of male members of households 
(Byrne and Baden, 1995). 
 
2.3.2 Gendered Social Risks 
 
Social sources of vulnerability are often as or more important barriers to sustainable 
livelihoods and general well-being than economic shocks and stresses (CPRC, 2008). At a 
macro level, social exclusion and discrimination often inform and/or are perpetuated by 
formal policies, legislation, and institutions (e.g., low representation of women or minority 
groups in senior positions). In many countries, however, efforts to ensure that national laws 
and policies are consistent in terms of providing equal treatment and/or opportunities to 
citizens irrespective of gender, caste, race, ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality and disability are 
often weak or uneven, and hampered by a lack of resources to enforce such legislation, 
especially at the subnational level. 
 
At the meso or community level, absence of voice in community dialogues is a key source of 
vulnerability. For instance, women are often excluded from decision-making roles in 
community-level committees, and this gender-based exclusion may be further exacerbated by 
caste, class or religion. Some excluded groups are reluctant to access programs or claim rights 
and entitlements, fearing violence or abuse from more dominant community members. 
Another critical and related variable is social capital. Poverty may be compounded by a lack of 
access to social networks that provide access to employment opportunities but also support in 
times of crisis. It can also reinforce marginalization from policy decision-making processes. 
 
At the micro or intrahousehold level, social risk is related to limited intrahousehold decision-
making and bargaining power based on age and/or gender, and time poverty as a result of 
unpaid productive work responsibilities and/or familial care work. All of these can reduce 
time and resources available for wider livelihood or coping strategies, and may contribute to 
women tolerating discriminatory and insecure employment conditions and/or abusive 
domestic relationships. Life-course status may also exacerbate intrahousehold social 
vulnerabilities. Girls are often relatively voiceless within the family, and a source of unpaid 
The SMERU Research Institute 10
domestic/care work labor. The elderly (especially widows) also tend to face particular 
marginalization, as they come to be seen as nonproductive and in some contexts even a threat 
to scarce resources. 
 
 
2.4 Applying a Gender Lens to Food Subsidy Programs  
 
Food subsidy programs usually offer a proportion of staple food at a subsidised rate, often on 
a monthly basis, specifically targeted at poor households. They have been a popular 
mechanism in many countries to address ongoing levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, 
for example in India and Pakistan, as well as a response to macro-level shocks to protect the 
poor from sharply increased food prices, as in Indonesia during the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis and more recently in the Philippines as a result of the 2007/08 food price crisis. Food 
subsidies can have important direct and indirect effects on household well-being: given that 
the majority of total income in poor households is spent on food, availability of subsidized 
food not only supports consumption but also can release household income for other 
expenditure, such as health and education expenses. 
  
Although the potential benefits of food subsidies are important, various studies have 
highlighted the challenges associated with policy and implementation, including high rates of 
corruption, dilution of benefits among beneficiaries because of targeting errors and leakages, 
late and unpredictable delivery and poor quality food (Hastuti et al., 2008; Pasha et al., 2000; 
Saxena, 2001). More recently, there have been calls for reforming such food subsidies into 
cash transfers or other alternatives, on the basis that subsidies are often entrenched in vested 
interests of particular groups and are a costly and inefficient mechanism to promote food 
security (e.g., Cook, 2009; Farrington et al., 2004). 
 
Taking a gender perspective to food subsidy programs highlights a number of important 
issues. First, some food subsidy programs specifically target women to address lifecycle 
vulnerabilities or to respond to labor market inequalities. In Mozambique, the Food Subsidy 
Program (PSA) specifically includes malnourished pregnant women in the eligibility criteria 
(identified by nurses during antenatal consultations) (Taimo and Waterhouse, 2007). In 
Bangladesh, innovative responses to the food price crisis in 2007/08 recognized women’s 
disadvantages in the urban labor market and included a price subsidy on cereal grains for 
women garment and tea workers as part of the government’s larger response to rising food 
prices (Köhler et al., 2009). 
  
Second, Quisumbing and McClafferty (2006) argue that recognizing gender and 
intrahousehold dynamics to inform projects and policies is essential: resources targeted at the 
household level can end up poorly distributed if intrahousehold inequalities are not accounted 
for, and may reinforce and perpetuate unequal power relations. The authors argue that 
assumptions are often made that subsidizing food can increase consumption by the most 
vulnerable members in a household. Taking a collective view of the household, one which 
recognizes bargaining power and disagreement within households, suggests that additional 
policy measures can be taken to promote more equal distribution of resources within the 
household. This approach emphasizes increasing women’s empowerment, status, and 
decision-making in the household. In other words, food subsidies should not be considered 
the only way to improve child nutrition: increasing mothers’ access to resources through credit 
schemes or income transfer programs may be more effective (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 
2006). 
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Third, and linked to the above point, an analysis of the Sri Lankan rice subsidy program found 
important gendered effects of the program, even though there was no explicit consideration 
of gender effects in its design. An evaluation by Sahn and Alderman (1996) (in Ezemenari et 
al., 2002) examined how men’s and women’s decision to participate in the labor market and 
the number of hours they worked was affected by a household’s receipt of a rice subsidy. The 
authors found that, for rural or urban men and urban women, the transfer did not influence 
the decision to participate in the labor market. However, the transfer appeared to decrease the 
probability of female labor force participation in rural areas. Unfortunately, no data are 
available to show whether reduced time working was translated into increased leisure time or 
home production activities, or whether the decline in work for women led to a decline in 
income and patterns of consumption. 
 
These issues point to a number of important policy considerations to bear in mind in relation 
to gender and food security/social protection policies in general, and subsidies in particular:  
• Policymakers must design programs that do not exacerbate gender inequalities but aim to 
improve efficiency. A key message is that the gender of the transfer recipient matters for 
household expenditure (Ezemenari et al., 2002).  
• Programs need to account for the fact that women and men experience and respond to 
shocks differently (Ezemenari et al., 2002).   
• The dual role of women has strong implications for differential labor incentive effects 
between men and women in social protection design (Ezemenari et al., 2002).  
• There are programs in which particular gender effects need to be incorporated 
(Ezemenari et al., 2002).  
• The effects of food aid, subsidies and rehabilitation programs must consider women the 
principal providers of food for the household. In documentation and registration 
procedures, women should have the right to register in their own name and programs 
should ensure that women household heads receive benefits (FAO/WFP 2005, in World 
Bank, 2009).  
• In the interests of sustainable improvements to children’s nutritional status, women’s 
status should be increased. Options for realizing this change include policy reform to 
eradicate gender discrimination and policies and programs that seek to reduce power 
inequalities between women and men by proactively promoting “catch-up” for women. 
Examples include: targeting women for access to new resources; implementing cash 
transfer programs that promote girls’ entry into education and health care systems; 
introducing labor-saving water and fuel technologies; providing subsidies for child care 
for working parents; and initiating programs to improve the nutritional status of 
adolescent girls and young women (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 2006). 
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III. OVERVIEW OF GENDERED RISKS AND 
VULNERABILITIES IN INDONESIA 
 
 
Indonesia has undergone many changes during the past five decades of national development. 
Despite some slowdowns in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the high rate of 
economic growth the country enjoyed during the pre-crisis period has made a significant 
contribution to the improvement in people’s welfare. As Figure 2 indicates, poverty incidence 
decreased significantly, from 40% in 1976 to 11.3% just before the crisis. Yet, as this high 
growth may have led to different effects on men and women, more detailed analysis is needed 
to enable a more appropriate understanding of the nature of this development, especially in 
terms of gender differentials between men and women.  
 
 
Figure 2. Official poverty rates in Indonesia, 1976–2009  
Source: Suryahadi et al., 2010.  
 
 
3.1 Gender Dimension of Poverty in Indonesia  
 
According to Suryahadi et al. (2010), it is quite difficult to define the gendered nature of 
poverty in Indonesia, as no data disaggregated by sex are available at individual level. National 
Social-Economic Survey (Susenas) data, produced by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) to generate 
official statistics on poverty incidence in the country, use the household as the unit of analysis 
of any poverty measurement. Consequently, we have to look at other indicators to see the 
gender imbalance in poverty incidence, as well as disaggregating poverty by sex at household 
level. 
  
Data on male- and female-headed households show that, despite a higher rate of poverty 
among male-headed households (17.7% versus 15.9% for female-headed households in 2004), 
they have relatively better life quality. In 1999, the World Bank found that male-headed 
households had higher expenditure levels, by 14.4% and 28.4% in urban and rural areas, 
respectively. This gap became even wider in 2002, at 15.8% for urban and 31.1% for rural 
areas (World Bank, 2006). In fact, the number of female-headed households increased from 
12.3% in 2006 to 12.9% in 2008, meaning more women living in poverty over the past couple 
of years (Suryahadi et al., 2010). 
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Another way to measure the gender dimension of poverty is to look at gender imbalances 
between male and female workers, especially the working poor in both domestic and 
international labor markets. By definition, the working poor refer to individuals who, despite 
their work, remain in poverty, because of limited income or dependant expenses (ILO, 2009, 
in Suryahadi et al., 2010). By considering differences in the labor participation rate between 
men and women, it is apparent that the proportion of the female working poor is higher. 
There are 216 male working poor (21.6%) for every 1,000 male workers but 238 female 
working poor (23.8%) for every 1,000 female workers (Suryahadi et al., 2010). As is discussed 
in the next section, female workers also receive lower wages than their male counterparts. 
 
With regard to food security in particular, an increase in women’s income is positively correlated 
with an increase in household expenditure on food, but it is also women who have to bear more 
of a burden when household income decreases or during economic shocks. During 1996-1998 
(Asian crisis years), prevalence of maternal malnutrition increased from 15% to 18%. In 1998, in 
Central and East Java provinces, 81% of poor pregnant women could not afford to eat eggs, 
meat or fish even once a weak (ADB, 2006a). A number of factors were responsible for this, 
including poverty, job losses, and decreased wages, but also traditional views that prioritize men 
as the breadwinners (Mboi, 1996, in Gondowarsito, 2002).3 
 
 
3.2 Gender and Economic Risks and Vulnerabilities 
 
Literature reviews on economic risks and vulnerabilities show that limited employment 
opportunities and inadequate pay constitute major causes of economic vulnerability for 
Indonesian women. Sociocultural issues may also contribute, as discussed further in the next 
section. For instance, it is apparent that women’s responsibility for taking care of the children 
often hinders their active participation in the labor market. Discriminatory practices, such as 
an inheritance system that allows land ownership only to men, may also contribute to the 
lower position of women in the household economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, 
though, it is apparent that there are far fewer employment opportunities for female workers 
than for male workers. In 2003, the absolute number of male workers was nearly double that 
of female workers: regardless of their educational background, women found it more difficult 
to find paid jobs (Suryahadi, 2004). In that year, there were only 31 million female workers, 
whereas the number of male workers amounted to 60 million. Employment of females 
stagnated in 1998-2001 and even decreased after 2002. This was to some extent a result of the 
Asian financial crisis, although the number of male workers continued to rise (ADB, 2006a). 
 
 
Figure 3. Employment growth by sex, Indonesia, 1990–2003  
Source: ADB, 2006a.  
                                                 
3In certain communities in East Nusa Tenggara, for instance, traditional prioritization of the husband partly 
explains the high rate of maternal and children mortality in the region (Gondowarsito, 252). 
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In terms of wage differentials, many surveys show that women receive lower wages than men. 
According to Pirmana (2006), female workers received only 71.2% to 76.7% of the wages their 
male counterparts received in 1999-2004. There is also some evidence that this is not always 
related to the different positions held. A comparative study by Suryahadi (2004) reveals that such 
lower wages were received not only by uneducated or unskilled women but also by those from 
high educational backgrounds who have relatively high positions as part of professional careers. 
 
Women’s lower position in the labor market is to some degree caused by Indonesia’s national 
development strategy, which does not accommodate women’s interests. Indonesia’s 
transformation from agriculture to a mixed economy of agriculture and modern industry has 
put female workers in a marginal position. As Table 3 indicates, this development has changed 
not only the structure of the national economy but also the structure of the labor market. 
Whereas the share of agriculture in GDP as indicated by its economic added value decreased 
significantly from 1970 to 1997, from 45% to only 16%, the proportion of Indonesian people 
living in urban areas increased more than twofold in the period, to more than one-third of the 
country’s total population (37%). Consequently, the pattern of employment changed 
significantly, with a large number of agricultural laborers transforming into off-farm urban 
workers. The share of the nonagricultural sector in employment creation in 1982 was only 
45.8%, but by 2002 this figure had increased quite significantly, to 55.1%. A more salient 
feature of this transformation is that the composition of urban workers had changed from 
only 17.4% in 1982 to 35.8% 20 years later (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Table 3. Indonesia’s Structural Transformation, 1970–1997 
Structural Indicator 1970 1997 
Agriculture’s added value (% of GDP)  45 16 
Agricultural employment (%)  66 55 
Urban population (%)  17 37 
Trade (% of GDP)  28 56 
Source: World Bank, 1999 cited in Wie, 2004.  
 
What is critical to note from this transformation is that, although the share of manufacturing 
in GDP rose considerably from 1960 to 1994, from only 9% to 24%, the number of workers 
in manufacturing increased only slightly in the same period, from 11% to 13%. Thus, in spite 
of its rising share in GDP, manufacturing failed to absorb millions of people excluded from 
agriculture: the number or workers in agriculture had declined sharply from 73% in 1960 to 
46% in 1994 (Baswir et al., 2003). Many of these workers preferred to migrate to urban areas 
to find jobs in the informal sector, given limited employment opportunities in rural areas. 
From a gender point of view in particular, this structural transformation appears to have 
brought fewer advantages for women. From 1990 to 2003, the female labor force participation 
rate dropped significantly, from 49.2% to 40.3%. Although a similar trend was found among 
male workers, it was not as sharp (ADB, 2006a). 
 
In many cases, the decrease in employment opportunities was followed by a decrease in wages. In 
the agriculture sector, loss of employment opportunities for rural women was exacerbated by a 
decrease in their agricultural wages. In response to the increasing cost of production demanded by 
modern agricultural systems, new types of working arrangements were introduced, such as closed 
harvest or planting systems. In contrast with the old system, which allowed the participation of 
everyone, the closed system allowed only certain people to take part in harvesting or planting. As 
women had dominated these two activities, the number of employment opportunities for women 
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decreased significantly. This was followed by a decrease in the wages received by female workers 
(Hüsken, 1998). Women’s share of total production decreased from 12.9% in the open system to 
only 6.9% under the closed system. In addition, a female worker might receive only half of the 
total wages she had previously received under the open system. 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, employment opportunities for women became a major issue in 
both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, a significant number of women lost their jobs: the 
number of women employed in paid jobs dropped considerably from its peak in 1997 of 
around 4 million to only 1.9 million in 2003. Many of these women migrated to find jobs in 
the cities, as indicated by an increase in the number of female workers in urban areas in the 
same period. However, the trend did not continue: the number of female urban workers 
began to decline in 2002 (ADB, 2006a). 
 
Urban female workers had to face no less difficult a situation. Women in the formal sector are 
typically concentrated in low-paying jobs or low-skilled occupations (ADB, 2006a). This results not 
only from the workers’ low educational background but also from certain policies that tend to 
marginalize female workers. Women were pushed into certain types of occupation that give low 
wages, such as the garment and textile industry, to support the country’s infant industry development. 
The government further used the low wages of female workers as one of the country’s comparative 
advantages for foreign investors. This problem has been worsened by a disregarding of women’s 
rights in the labor market and in the workplace (Table 4). Some of these discriminatory actions are 
deeply intertwined with women’s social risks, as the next section discusses. 
 
Table 4. Violations of Women’s Rights in Working Places 
Type of Discrimination Explanation 
Barriers to or nonexistent 
menstruation leave  
Ranging from complicated or unfriendly procedure to prohibition of leave during 
menstruation. 
Pregnancy not allowed for 
nonpermanent workers  
Nonpermanent female workers are not allowed to have a baby during the 
contract period, otherwise their contract will be terminated. They are not 
provided with pregnancy or maternity benefit.   
Unfriendly facility or working 
conditions  Time restrictions on going to the bathroom, unfriendly health facilities.  
Fewer employment benefits 
for married female workers  
Married female workers are often considered single workers to reduce the 
amount of employment benefit the company has to pay. This occurs on 
fundamental items like child and family assistance and health insurance.  
Wage discrimination  
Male workers’ salaries include some employment benefits, like child and family 
assistance, whereas female workers’ salaries do not. In some cases, male 
workers receive a salary on a daily basis but female workers receive theirs on 
a contract basis, which is usually lower.   
Contract or recruitment 
discrimination  
Companies recruit only unmarried women and do not take those over 25 years 
old. As such, women find fewer employment opportunities.  
Career development barriers  Maternity and menstruation leave often obstruct female workers’ career development as assessments usually take this leave into consideration.  
Source: Various sources, including Hidajadi (n.d.); Mundayat et al., 2008; and Subiyantoro, 2004. 
 
In the informal sector, which often serves as an economic safety net for those excluded from 
formal jobs, women often work in marginal sectors such as petty trade, unskilled or low-paid 
jobs or domestic work (Hartini, 2003). In fact, data show that women dominate the informal 
sector. Whereas the share of male workers in the urban informal sector rose from 39% to 
45% in 1998-2003, the share of female workers increased from 46% to 49% in the same 
period (ADB, 2006a). The figure was even higher in rural areas, with the share of female 
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workers in the informal sector increasing from 80% to 86% in 1998-2003 (male workers 
increased their share from 72% to 78% in 1997-2003). Wages in the informal sector often 
fluctuate and workers often do not have any access to social security. Consequently, they are 
more vulnerable to economic shocks or stresses. 
 
Related to economic vulnerabilities, environmental degradation such as deforestation may also 
lead to gendered impacts on women. Take the case of palm oil plantations in Sambas, West 
Kalimantan, for instance. As reported by Subiyantoro (2008), the expansion of palm oil 
plantations had a number of effects on women, ranging from the loss of employment 
opportunities to difficulties in accessing clean water. The forests used to provide women with 
abundant raw materials to make various handicrafts, such as rattan mats. Conversion of forest 
into palm oil plantations not only reduced women’s economic opportunities but also forced 
some women to start up new businesses, as their husbands lost their jobs after the forest 
became plantations. 
 
Economic shocks such as the Asian financial crisis also have an adverse impact on women. In 
Indonesia, despite overall improvements in malnutrition rates during the 1990s, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2008) reported, that during the drought and crisis of 1997/98, 
mothers from poor families responded by reducing their own dietary energy intake in order to 
feed their children better, resulting in increased maternal under-nutrition. Household 
purchases of more nutritious protein-rich foods were reduced in order to afford the main 
staple (rice), leading to increased prevalence of anaemia in both mothers and children. The 
effects were particularly severe for infants conceived and weaned during the crisis, as this has 
long-term and intergenerational effects on the growth and development of children. What is 
of great concern now is that, despite Indonesia’s growth during the most recent food, fuel and 
financial crisis, child malnutrition has been rising. Overall, 28% of children are underweight, 
more than 44% are stunted and a high prevalence of anaemia remains among children and 
women (WFP, n.d.).  
 
 
3.3 Gender and Social Risks and Vulnerabilities  
 
In many cases, social risks and vulnerabilities are deeply intertwined with economic ones, as 
the latter may be caused directly by the former or vice versa. For women in particular, these 
social risks or vulnerabilities may result from domestic roles and duties as well as certain 
norms or social constructs. Partly because of these “traditional” obstacles, women remain left 
behind by their male counterparts in many aspects of economic and social development. 
  
To begin with, in spite of increasing awareness of men in relation to taking part in managing 
domestic chores, women are still considered the main holders of domestic responsibility. In 
many places, particularly in rural areas, the idea of gender equality has not been widely 
circulated and the traditional gender division of labor has not undergone any significant 
changes. Depending on household characteristics, this may harm women as wives and 
mothers in a number of different ways. First, women usually have longer working hours than 
men: other than domestic chores, women also need to work. In urban areas, especially among 
informal and factory workers, a number of participatory poverty assessments have revealed 
that women’s responsibility for earning some money has increased in the past 10 or 15 years 
(Rahayu and Suharyo, 2004). However, the assessments did not find similar trends of 
increasing paid work for rural women. Second, many women lose jobs or employment 
opportunities because of their domestic responsibilities. Unavailability of other family 
members, especially older daughters or other female family members, and of child care 
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facilities often prevents women from taking jobs outside the home. Meanwhile, even though it 
is not explicitly mentioned as a reason for excluding women from work, many women in the 
formal sector are refused their previous position after giving birth (see Table 4). 
 
Still related to work, lack of education or skills is another problem that may prevent women 
from getting better-paid jobs. Data show that the literacy rate of females aged 15 years old and 
above (88.8%) is lower than that of males in the same age group (95.2%) (UNDP, 2009). The 
gap is much bigger among the poor: the literacy rate of women in the poorest quintile reached 
75.7% in 2002, whereas that of males reached nearly 90% (Jalal and Sardjunani, n.d.). Another 
indicator shows that, despite female students’ higher net enrollment rate at primary and 
secondary schools, their net enrollment rate at senior high school and tertiary level is lower 
than that of male students (ADB, 2006a). To some degree, this explains the lower position of 
female workers in the labor market. Even female graduates of senior high school find it 
difficult to find good paid jobs in the formal sector. Women’s domination of the informal 
sector confirms this situation. 
 
Without an appropriate policy to address the problem, it is likely that women’s education will 
continue to fall behind that of their male counterparts. Despite the government’s serious 
efforts to ensure the implementation of nine years of compulsory education for both male and 
female students at primary and junior high schools, there has been no significant effort to 
increase female student enrollment at senior high school and university levels. The 
government’s policy to provide free education through School Operational Assistance (BOS) 
covers only primary and junior high schools. People have to rely on their own resources to 
send their children to senior high schools and universities. The dropout rate of female 
students at these two higher levels is much higher than that of male students. The enrollment 
rate of male students at senior high school (38.8%) is higher than that of female students 
(37.7%). Similarly, at tertiary levels, net enrollment of female students (8.3%) is lower than 
that of male students (9.2%) (ADB, 2006a). 
 
Another risk comes from women’s lack of access to decision making in the family and society 
in general, as well as at state level. The number of women holding strategic positions in the 
state bureaucracy is considerably lower than the number of men. In the post of kabupaten 
(district) head, for example, women held only five out of 336 seats (1.5%) in 2002 (ADB, 
2006a). In the House of Representatives (DPR), despite affirmative action to increase the 
number of female lawmakers to at least 30% of the total number of members, this was still far 
below the stated objective (18%).4 In terms of quantity, which often really matters in the case 
of voting,5 this small number has made it difficult for female lawmakers to articulate their 
voices. 
  
Meanwhile, at household level, even though women play a significant role in managing 
household income, their position is generally lower than that of husbands, who usually 
dominate decision making, especially on issues considered strategic (Rahayu and Suharyo, 
2004). Even on issues closely related to women, like health and child delivery, it is often men 
who make the final decision. Evidence indicates that such practices have serious effects on 
women’s well-being. As noted before, prioritisation of husbands as breadwinners in some 
communities in Nusa Tenggara Timur partly explains the high rate of maternal mortality rate 
in the region. The practice also negatively affects women’s daily food intake (Mboi, 1996 cited 
in Gondowarsito, 2002).   
                                                 
4This number is higher than the number of female lawmakers in the 2004–2009 period (11%) (Saraswati, 2004). 
5Personal interviews with a female lawmaker at DPR, 23 October 2009. 
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It is also important to note that many traditional views that prioritise men over women remain 
in place. For instance, it used to be common practice among many different ethnic groups in 
Indonesia to prioritize boys over girls, as boys were seen to be the ones who would continue 
the family name. Boys would go on to participate in public life and girls would replace their 
mothers in domestic matters, therefore boys’ education was seen as top priority. Even though 
such views may have changed among the younger generation, the fact that the female 
enrollment rate is lower than the male enrollment rate indicates that these views may prevail. 
Another case of male prioritization can be seen in inheritance practices. Except for a few cases 
of matrilineal kinship systems, such as that of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, in which 
land is inherited through the female line (Jendrius, 2007), most ethnic groups in Indonesia 
practice inheritance customary laws that prioritize sons over daughters. This results from 
traditional views that men are superior to women, as men usually bear the responsibility for 
feeding the family (Hutagalung et al., 2009). This often puts women in a vulnerable position, 
without land to call their own. If a woman’s husband passes away, land owned by the deceased 
man will go to his relatives, unless he has a son. 
 
It is not only in private matters that traditional views on gender affect women’s well-being. 
Evidence indicates that such negative perspectives also affect public attitudes towards women. 
In the workplace in particular, as Table 5 indicates, a number of labels, derived to some degree 
from cultural views of women, have a negative effect on women’s positions or wages. 
 
Table 5. Labels Given to Female Workers and the Consequences  
“Positive” Consequences “Negative” Consequences 
1. Accurate  
2. Obedient and 
disciplined  
3. Afraid to corrupt  
4. Not demanding  
5. Follow procedures  
6. Patient  
7. Can survive routines 
 
1. Female laborers are 
given easier tasks with 
low economic value, 
such as cutting, sewing 
and packing  
2. Female laborers get 
small salaries  
1. Reserved  
2. Give up easily when 
facing a problem  
3. Indecisive  
4. Avoid risks  
5. Physically weak  
6. Not visionary  
7. Family oriented, not 
work oriented 
1. Companies choose male 
staff over females to be 
supervisors 
2. Female laborers are prone 
to maltreatment by male 
supervisors 
3. Stricter rules for female 
laborers, for example they 
are not allowed to get 
married or to have children in 
certain periods of time 
 
Source: Subiyantoro, 2004.   
 
In public policy, a typical case of gender negligence is seen in the case of conflict or disaster 
management. Women’s specific needs are often neglected, as emergency aid is often seen as 
gender neutral. Most aid is given in the form of food or kitchen utensils. Even though this 
supports women, as it is usually they who cook, their needs certainly go beyond utensils, 
which in fact help all people in camps in general. For instance, women often find it difficult to 
obtain napkins or find a place for feeding children. Food supplements or vitamins highly 
needed by pregnant or lactating mothers are often ignored amid abundant medical aids 
(Subiyantoro, 2008). Meanwhile, damage to public facilities caused by disaster or armed 
conflict makes it even more difficult for women to access health facilities (El-Muttaqien, 2008). 
Furthermore, disasters or conflicts have different effects on men and women, with the latter 
often suffering more. Women have to take care of their family members as well as providing 
food in public kitchens (Subiyantoro, 2008). During conflict in particular, there is evidence of 
increases in violence against and sexual harassment of women (El-Muttaqien, 2008).   
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3.4 Overview of Gendered Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Research Sites 
 
Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan are located in different parts of Indonesia. 
Tapanuli Tengah is located in the western part of the country, in North Sumatra province, and 
Timor Tengah Selatan is located in the province of East Nusa Tenggara, considered as among 
the poorest regions of the country. The fieldwork in Tapanuli Tengah was carried out in 
Sawah Lama and Muara Dua (not real names), whereas that in Timor Tengah Selatan was 
conducted in Ujung Atas and Sungai Tua (not real names). In spite of their geographical and 
livelihood differences, agriculture remains the main source of income for the majority in all 
four villages, but different types of crops mean that livelihoods are quite varied. Villagers in 
Sawah Lama and Muara Dua have various income sources, including rice cultivation, rubber 
extraction, palm oil fruit and other types of casual work. The majority of people in Sawah 
Lama work on paddy fields whereas most of those in Muara Dua work on rubber plantations. 
Villagers in Ujung Atas and Sungai Tua rely predominantly on maize as their main staple food. 
Table 6 below briefly describes the socioeconomic condition of the villages. 
 
Table 6. Socioeconomic Condition of the Research Sites 
Tapanuli Tengah Timor Tengah Selatan 
 
Sawah Lama Muara Dua Ujung Atas Sungai Tua 
Area  43.29km2a 6.02km2a   
Population  1,081 peoplea 2,813 peoplea   
Households  239 HHsa 637 HHsa   
Livelihoods  
Rice cultivation, 
rubber extraction, 
palm oil fruit 
Rubber extraction, 
rice cultivation Maize cultivation Maize cultivation 
Ethnicity  Batak Batak Timor Timor 
Religion  Islam and Christiana Islam and Christiana Christian Christian 
Raskin 
beneficiaries  
118 HHs (real 
beneficiaries include 
nearly all villagers) 
290 HHs (real 
beneficiaries 
include 350 HHs) 
380 HHs (real 
beneficiaries 
include all HHs, 
732) 
276 HHs (actual 
beneficiaries 
include 470 HHs) 
Female-headed 
households  
Around 20 HHs 
(8.4%) 
Around 50 HHs 
(7.8%)   
Poverty rate  Approx. 75% Approx 70%   
Raskin allocation  3.540kg b   
Source: All information compiled from interviews with key informants, except a(from sub-district officials), b Sub-district 
government decided that some of the Raskin rice allocated to Muara Dua should be transferred to a neighboring village to 
meet the higher demands of the rice in this village. 
 
3.4.1 Economic and Environmental Risks and Vulnerabilities  
 
Evidence shows that the two districts have different types of economic risks and 
vulnerabilities. In Tapanuli Tengah, it appears that land ownership shapes people’s economic 
security. Interviews with some key informants revealed that only a small number of villagers 
have their own land. Out of 52 respondents, randomly selected from among Raskin 
beneficiaries, 29 (55.8%) claimed that they do not have land (Table 7) and that they have to 
rent land, sharecrop other people’s land or work as agricultural laborers. In contrast, nearly all 
respondents in Timor Tengah Selatan have their own land. Out of 51 respondents, only one 
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rents land. However, because of the soil topography and the dry climate, maize is cultivated 
only once a year, resulting in a number of food-insecure months every year.   
 
Table 7. Land Ownership and Control 
Timor Tengah Selatan Tapanuli Tengah 
Type of Land 
% of HHs Size of Land (ha) % of HHs Size of Land (ha) 
Own cultivated land   45 0.7 16 0.8 
Rented-in land  1 0.5 1 0.5 
Rented-out land  1 1.5 - - 
Sharecropped-in land  - - 28 0.7 
Sharecropped-out land  1 0.5 4 0.3 
Other type of land (like uncultivated land) 17 1.3 4 0.9 
Sources: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
In Tapanuli Tengah, households that do not have land could rent land or sharecrop, but this 
does not guarantee work for all family members, male and female. According to local 
custom, rubber extraction is male work whereas rice cultivation is female work, but the 
majority of land in both villages is dry, used for rubber plantations – paddy fields constitute 
only a small part of the village area. This means that employment opportunities for female 
villagers are fewer than those for men. This affects not only female villagers who rent in or 
sharecrop land, but also women from households unable to do so, who have to work as 
agricultural workers instead. Limited employment opportunities in the village mean that 
female villagers look for agricultural jobs outside instead, with many women working on 
palm oil plantations in neighboring villages. Some women go to work in the paddy fields. 
However, such jobs are not always available all year, and there is also no guarantee that they 
will be able to find such work outside the village. Women state that, on average, they work 
for only three or four days a week. 
 
Female villagers are economically more vulnerable than men also in terms of wages they 
receive. According to local tradition, a male worker receives approximately Rp 35,000 ($3.89) 
per day, whereas a female worker receives only Rp 23,000 ($2.56) per day, even for the same 
type of work. Women often have no choice but to work for lower wages. In both female and 
male FGDs, participants said that rubber extraction pays on average Rp 150,000 ($16.67) to 
Rp 200,000 ($22.22) per week. However, workers receive this only after two weeks of working. 
Other problems arise during the rainy season in particular, as heavy rainfall makes rubber 
extraction much more difficult. 
 
In contrast, women in Timor Tengah Selatan usually work together with their husbands in 
their fields. Local custom maintains that it is mostly men who are responsible for preparing 
the land, which is considered tough work, whereas women play a significant role during the 
harvest period. It is women’s task to harvest the maize and men’s to take the harvest home. 
Despite women’s significant contributions in agriculture, the widely accepted view is that it is 
men who work in the fields, with women only helping their husbands. To some degree, the 
persistence of this perspective is deeply rooted in local inheritance practices, which prioritise 
sons over daughters. The logic of marriage exchanges among the Timor, traditionally called 
belis, requires the bridegroom and his family to present a certain amount of goods in exchange 
for the bride’s position as a member of her husband’s family. Under such a system, parents 
usually transfer land to the son after their marriage. Only certain families, usually rich ones, 
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provide their daughters with land after the marriage. Because of this, the man is seen as the 
breadwinner, which further marginalizes the woman’s position in agriculture. In Timor 
Tengah Selatan, this attitude means that income earning is the husband’s responsibility, while 
the wife must do household chores and take care of household dependants. 
 
In terms of cash income, as in Tapanuli Tengah, women in Timor Tengah Selatan have less 
access to employment opportunities than men. Owing to the prevalence of subsistence 
farming, demand for a cash income is not as high as in Tapanuli Tengah. However, as some 
household necessities cannot be gained from the fields, e.g. salt, sugar, side dishes, cooking 
spices, children’s school fees and other household needs, they need to be bought to 
supplement maize production, which is usually for own consumption. Some households may 
obtain a cash income from selling tamarind or other agricultural products besides maize. 
However, as this may not generate enough money to cover all the household’s needs, people 
still need to do side jobs. In this, men have far more opportunities, such as in construction or 
carpentry, which are considered men’s work. A few women have opened small stalls in front 
of or near their house, although the most widely practised activity for female villagers is 
weaving cloth. Not every piece of cloth is sold in the market – some is worn by the women 
themselves or by other family members. 
 
Seen from a longer-term perspective, dependency on the husband as the breadwinner, which 
contributes to fewer employment opportunities and lower wages for women, leads to 
economic dependency. Apart from in social matters, especially in terms of husband–wife 
power relations in the household, the impacts of this can be seen clearly during economic 
shocks or crises. In late 2008, many women in Tapanuli Tengah were forced to work – for 
those who had not worked before—or to work harder and longer because of the global 
economic crisis. This was particularly because of the drop in the price of rubber, from Rp 
12,000 ($1.33) to Rp 4,400 ($0.490) per kilogram. At an individual level, a husband’s death or a 
divorce will put a woman in a very difficult situation. In Figure 4, the death of NS’s husband 
forced her to enter the labor market to feed her three young children. Her husband had 
previously worked to support the family while she took care of the children. The death of her 
husband affected her well-being considerably, as well as that of her three children. 
 
Figure 4. NS after the death of her husband 
Source: Life history. 
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3.4.2 Social Risks and Vulnerabilities 
 
In both Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan, traditional norms on gender and 
household chores have affected women’s participation in both economic activities and public 
life. Traditional gender roles maintain that it is wives’ responsibility to do the household 
chores as well as caring for children. Men acknowledge that some household work should be 
done together as a couple, like fetching water or wood and caring for the children, but in 
practice women do the majority of the household work. Consequently, women have to spend 
a significant part of their time managing domestic matters and taking care of the children, 
whereas men usually spend just a few hours a week helping their wives clean the house or care 
for the children. Meanwhile, both husbands and wives have to work to obtain an income. As 
Table 8 shows, no fewer than 85% of female respondents in Tapanuli Tengah reported 
economic activities as their main daily activity. In contrast, only 6.5% claimed that their main 
activity is managing domestic matters. For many women, the double burden of earning some 
money and managing household chores has resulted in time poverty. Some also reported that 
responsibility for the household chores and for caring for the children has kept them from 
getting a better job. One respondent stated that she stopped working as a trader because of 
increased domestic responsibilities after her second child was born.   
 
Table 8. Main Activities of Poor People in Tapanuli Tengah 
Activity Husbands (%) Wives (%) 
Subsistence farming  49 66 
Commercial farming  17 4.5 
Agricultural work  17 13 
Daily waged employment (not regular/permanent) 5 2 
Regular waged employment  0 0 
Household chores  0 6.5 
Care of household dependants  0 0 
Unemployed  5 2 
Other   7 6 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
Working hours in Timor Tengah Selatan are more flexible, as people usually work their own 
land. Women go to the field after finishing the cooking and other domestic chores. Moreover, 
women’s works usually reaches a peak only during the harvest period, which is usually in 
February at the earliest and April or May at the latest. From August to December, the land is 
prepared by men for the next year’s production, so women’s workload is not so demanding. It 
is in this context that the results of the household survey on villagers’ main activities, 
especially female villagers’ activities, should be read. Data collection was conducted during the 
land preparation period, so is subject to a time bias: it appeared that 45% of women in Timor 
Tengah Selatan had household chores as their main activity (Table 9). Nevertheless, in Timor 
Tengah Selatan domestic chores are unlikely to prevent women from participating in 
economic activities. 
 
However, the attitude towards this labor division, that household chores management belongs 
to women and income generation to men, poses some problems for women in relation to 
engaging in economic activities. Whereas women in Tapanuli Tengah can undertake paid 
employment, women in Timor Tengah Selatan cannot, as paid jobs are usually taken by men. 
The SMERU Research Institute 23
For example, it is difficult for women to do casual work, like construction work, as this is 
usually given to men, although women can also do such work. Women can only open small 
stalls in front of their house or weave clothes to get money. Even so, some widows have to 
prepare the land themselves, in spite of the commonly held view that this work is suitable only 
for men. 
 
Table 9. Main Activities of Poor People in Timor Tengah Selatan 
Activity Husbands (%) Wives (%) 
Subsistence farming (1)  91  46  
Commercial farming (2)  2.5  0  
Agricultural work (5)  0  0  
Daily waged employment (not regular/permanent) (11) 0  0  
Regular waged employment (12)  2  0  
Household chores (16)  0  45  
Care of household dependants (17)  0  5  
Unemployed (15)  2.5  0  
Other  2  4  
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
In Tapanuli Tengah, traditional views on men’s and women’s roles obstruct women’s 
economic activities to a certain degree, especially in terms of getting better wages for their 
work. According to local tradition, as shown earlier, male workers are paid more than female 
workers, even for the same type of work. The common view is that this is because men are 
stronger than women. In fact, physical strength is not the only determinant of a good worker. 
One key informant, male, said that in the paddy fields he prefers to employ women, because 
they are usually more patient than men. Men also stop to smoke and therefore rest more than 
female workers. “People here think that men are stronger. But for me, I prefer to hire women, 
they do not smoke … if you take male workers, they smoke …They often take cigarette 
breaks. In contrast, women take fewer breaks (male villager, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009).” 
 
Another social risk is women’s limited participation in public decision-making, which usually 
occurs in hamlet or village meetings. In Timor Tengah Selatan, if not by hamlet or village 
leaders, community decisions are usually made by male villagers without involving female 
villagers. Some female respondents said that this may have resulted from the prevalence of a 
patriarchal culture that often sees women as merely complementary to men. If women are 
involved in meetings, their role is usually limited to preparing food. 
 
Different factors restrict women in Tapanuli Tengah from participating in community 
meetings. In Muara Dua, the head of the village acknowledged that, even though women are 
also invited to meetings, because they are usually conducted at night very few women can 
attend. Night is the best time for male villagers, as they have to work during the day, but 
women find it difficult to leave home at night, as they usually have to take care of their 
children. If meetings are conducted during the day, women can participate and be more 
involved in the decision-making process. For example, according to interviews, under the 
National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri), at least 50% of meeting 
participants had to be women. By changing the time of meetings to during the day, women 
could participate and, in fact, more women than men started attending meetings. 
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3.4.3 Coping Strategies  
 
Out of the two types of risks and vulnerabilities, namely, economic and social, people are 
more cognisant of the former and oblivious to the latter. As such, most coping strategies are 
taken to tackle economic problems. In Tapanuli Tengah, taking a loan from a local stall or 
from relatives or neighbors and undertaking additional paid jobs are the main coping strategies 
of poor households. It is usually husbands who take out loans. 
 
Poor people in Timor Tengah Selatan have more options than those in Tapanuli Tengah. As 
Table 10 indicates, these include undertaking more paid jobs, sale of assets and relying on 
government assistance (29.8%, 23.4% and 21.3%, respectively). At 13%, getting a loan is also a 
coping strategy, but its intensity is considerably lower than in Tapanuli Tengah (43.2%).  
 
Table 10. Main Coping Strategies in the Research Sites 
Coping Strategy Tapanuli Tengah (%) Timor Tengah Selatan (%) 
Increased indebtedness (to local stalls/relatives)  43.2  12.8  
Undertake more paid jobs  31.6  29.8  
Reduced quality and quantity of food consumption 6.3  7.5  
Distress sale of assets  3.2  23.4  
Rely on government assistance  2.1  21.3  
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
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IV. INTEGRATION OF GENDER INTO THE SOCIAL 
PROTECTION AGENDA 
 
 
Development of social policy in Indonesia was very much influenced by the crisis in 1997/98. 
Prior to this, most social policies were generally targeted at all citizens, regardless of their 
economic status. They were integrated into ministerial programs like those in health and 
education. Targeted social programs were quite limited in number and usually focused on 
specific vulnerable groups like the elderly or the disabled. To mitigate the severe impact of the 
crisis on people’s welfare,6 the government of Indonesia implemented a number of social 
safety net programs, consisting of four main components: food security, health, education and 
employment creation (Sumarto et al., 2001). Some programs were later modified, and a 
number of new programs were also added to help develop a more institutionalized form of 
social protection policy in the country. This section highlights key issues faced by the 
government of Indonesia in this agenda, with specific attention to assessing the extent to 
which gender has been integrated into social protection policy to date. 
 
 
4.1 Social Protection in Indonesia  
 
After the 1997/98 crisis, there were some major developments in the provision of social 
protection by the state. In contrast with the pre-crisis period, when people had to rely 
predominantly on their own assets or help from relatives, neighbors or close friends to 
mitigate difficulties (Cook, 2009), a number of assistance programs are now provided by the 
state. 
 
To begin with, it is worth noting that, in spite of differences in defining social protection, 
there is growing consensus among scholars and practitioners to do so in a broader way, to 
include not only social assistance and promotional measures but also social insurance (Voipio, 
2007). In terms of the types of risks that social protection interventions should address, as 
discussed in Section 2, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007) and Holmes and Jones (2009) 
argue that social protection should take into consideration not only economic risks and 
vulnerabilities but also social ones. Without addressing social risks and vulnerabilities, safety 
nets or other similar programs would be only ‘economic protection’ and not ‘social protection’. 
For this purpose, social protection should be transformative in such a way that it addresses 
social risks and vulnerabilities. Derived from this idea, some argue for social protection to 
include regulations or policies aimed at enhancing the social position of certain people or 
groups of people, in addition to the inclusion of such measures in every social protection 
program. 
 
Seen from this perspective, Table 11 indicates that most of the efforts taken by the 
government to develop social protection policy since the 1997/98 crisis have focused very 
much on the provision of social assistance and promotional measures, such as Raskin, the 
unconditional cash transfer program (BLT), the conditional cash transfer program (PKH), 
community development, BOS, and health insurance for the poor. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6During the peak of the 1997 crisis, an additional 36 million people fell into poverty (Sumarto et al., 2001). 
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Table 11. Social Protection Programs in Indonesia 
Program Design Coverage 
Protective: Social assistance (protection and productivity-enhancing measures) 
Food subsidy (Raskin) Sale of subsidised rice to targeted poor households  
17.1 million poor 
households (2010)   
Unconditional cash transfer 
(BLT) 
Cash transfer for poor households in times of 
economic shock  
19.2 million poor 
households (2008)  
Conditional cash transfer 
(PKH) 
Provision of allowance for chronically poor 
households for human development  
720,000 chronically poor 
households (2009)  
Protective: Social services 
School Operational Assistance 
(BOS) 
General subsidy for all students at elementary 
and secondary schools  
35.8 million students 
(2008)  
Health Insurance for the Poor 
(Jamkesmas) 
Free basic medical services with referral system 
to public hospitals for poor people  
72 million poor people 
(2008)  
Preventative: Social insurance  
Social Insurance for Workers 
(Jamsostek) 
Employment accident, health care, old age and 
death benefits  
23.73 million employees 
in formal sector   
Promotive 
People’s Business Credit 
(KUR) 
Provided up to Rp 5 million ($555.56) for small 
entrepreneurs  
Targeted 2 million people 
in 2008 and 4 million in 
2009  
Revolving Fund for Poor 
Women (SPP)  Revolving fund for poor women    
Social Empowerment Fund 
(BLPS)  
Provision of business capital for people’s 
business groups   
3,907 business groups in 
80 districts in 32 
provinces  
National Program of 
Community Empowerment 
(PNPM Mandiri)  
Basic social infrastructure in poor villages in 
order to enhance local development and create 
employment opportunities  
14.1 million people 
(2008)  
Agricultural Enterprises 
Development (PUAP)  
Provided Rp 1 million ($111.11) per agricultural 
group  
Given to 10,573 
agricultural villages in 33 
provinces  
Social equity and socially transformative measures (issues of social equity and exclusion)  
Gender quota (in general elections, PNPM Mandiri)  
Other social protection mechanisms  
Social assistance for elderly 
people  
Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 
($33.33) per person per month  
Targets 10,000 elderly 
people (2010)  
Social assistance for troubled 
migrant workers  
Provision of social assistance for migrant 
workers having problems while abroad   
Targets 29,818 migrant 
workers in Malaysia (2010) 
Social assistance for street 
children  Provision of allowance for children’s families  
Targets 165 households 
in Jakarta  
Social assistance for disabled 
people  
Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 
($33.33) per person per month  
Targets 17,000 disabled 
people (2010)  
House repair  Provision of allowance for poor households to repair their house  
2,346 houses in 13 
provinces (2010)  
Source: Various sources. 
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In 2004, a Social Protection Law was passed in Indonesia. Implementation has been slow, 
however: the government has argued that it needs time to prepare the institutional 
infrastructure and cites budgetary constraints.7 Some argue that the government has in actual 
fact been rather reluctant to implement the law. More than five years after it was passed, the 
regulations needed to support its implementation are not yet ready. Some efforts have been 
made, such as the formation of an implementing agency, but it may still be some time before 
the law really comes into force (Suara Karya, 2009). 
 
Implementing social assistance programs is in practice much easier than putting in place social 
insurance programs, because the latter require not only financial sustainability but also a solid 
legal framework and institutional arrangements. There is great concern about this limited 
attention to social insurance. Of particular importance is how to extend coverage to include 
not only formal workers but also informal ones (ILO, 2008). Out of 36 million formal 
workers in the country, only 10.5 million (11% of the total labor force) are covered by the 
Jamsostek Social Insurance for Workers program. This does not include another 61.5 million 
workers (63% of the total labor force) in the informal sector in both urban areas (16.1 million 
people or 17% of the total labor force) and rural ones (45.4 million people or 47% of the 
labor force) (ILO, 2008). 
 
There are also a number of challenges to the effective implementation of other social 
protection instruments and, with regard to social assistance itself, a number of issues remain 
unsolved. First, regarding program efficiency and effectiveness, leakage and undercoverage are 
still widespread in many programs. Second, a more fundamental question touches on the need 
to rearrange the institutional structure of program implementation, which means approaching 
the sensitive issue of the politics of social protection. Social protection programs in Indonesia 
are fragmented in many different agencies, with low coordination among them. Despite an 
increasing discourse on social protection so far, little attention has been given to the issue of 
social risks and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the government has 
improved the quality of the programs: despite weaknesses and limitations in implementation, 
efforts have shown a clear progression towards equity and efficiency in terms of targeting the 
poor (Sumarto at al., 2008). In some regions, local government initiatives have further 
widened the coverage of programs carried out by the central government. 
  
Be that as it may, the slow progress of social protection in Indonesia is a result not only of the 
government’s limited capacity but also of other factors, such as political parties and the people 
themselves. Political parties and lawmakers at the DPR do not seem to consider social 
protection an important issue. Even though a specific commission is already in place to handle 
the issue of social welfare (Commission VIII), there has been no significant effort to 
mainstream social protection policy.8 Meanwhile, civil society demands for the implementation 
of social protection policy have been not high either. Social protection is a minor issue among 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Most NGOs seem to pay more attention to political 
rights than to economic and social ones, within which issues of social protection may be 
categorized. Indonesian trade unions also pay little attention to social protection policy. These 
organizations defend the rights of their members, such as on minimum wages, using a case-
by-case approach, without linking to the broader strategic issue of social insurance for 
workers.9 
 
                                                 
7Interview with an official from the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), Jakarta, 23 October 2009. 
8Interview with a female lawmaker, Jakarta, 23 October 2009. 
9Interviews with a male national NGO activist, concerned with the issue of poverty and social protection. 
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Meanwhile, despite some progress by the government on implementing social assistance 
programs (Sumarto at al., 2008), a number of problems remain. Reports suggest that leakages 
and undercoverage are still common. In the Raskin program, for instance, it seems that there 
has been no significant improvement in the way the government has handled problems of 
leakages and undercoverage. In spite of severe criticism by many agencies on this particular 
aspect, there has been no real change in the distribution of Raskin rice. From 2002–2006, the 
proportion of subsidized rice received by poor households in the two lowest quintiles 
remained the same, at approximately 52% (Hastuti et al., 2008).   
  
Conventional explanations argue that leakages and undercoverage were very much influenced 
by the accuracy of poverty data supplied by BPS. However, in looking at BPS efforts to 
update the poverty data, especially by undertaking a socioeconomic survey of potential 
program recipients (Iriana, n.d.), it seems that the crux of the matter lies elsewhere, especially 
in the institutional structure of program implementation. As such, the issue is not only 
administrative, that is, one of data accuracy, but also, more fundamentally, political—related to 
power relations among different state and nonstate actors involved in program 
implementation. Evidence indicates that the problem is in every level of state bureaucracy, 
from district to national level.  
  
Social protection programs in Indonesia are fragmented and spread across many different 
agencies. Coordination has been found to be very weak among these different agencies. Down 
to the local level, it is apparent that the use of the village administration for such individually 
targeted subsidy programs is not a good choice. Close relations between village headpeople 
and their staff and other villagers have made it difficult for the village administration to refuse 
villagers’ demands, which often contradict program objectives. In the case of Raskin, for 
instance, evidence from various regions indicates that it is quite difficult for village 
governments to refuse villagers’ demands to distribute Raskin rice equally to all villagers. 
Obviously, this contradicts the stated objective of the program of acting as a targeted subsidy 
for poor households. 
 
 
4.2 Integration of Gender in the Social Protection Agenda  
 
Generally speaking, women’s rights are highly appreciated in the state regulations. By law, 
women have the same rights and obligations as their male counterparts. The 1945 
Constitution Article 27 Verse 1 clearly states that ‘All citizens have equal status before the law 
and in government and shall abide by the law and the government without any exception.’ 
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 12 below, this principle of gender equality has been 
accommodated in a number of laws and other regulations. Besides, a number of strategic 
policies have been also made by the government to accelerate gender equality in Indonesia. In 
1998, a special commission was formed to eliminate all forms of violence against women. 
Several years later, gender inequality was officially included in the National Development Plan 
(Propenas) 2000–2004. Not less importantly, the government in 2000 renamed the Ministry of 
Women’s Roles to the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment. It was hoped that, with a new 
name, the ministry would approach women’s issues in Indonesia in a way that concentrates 
more on root causes. More recently, an affirmative action has been taken to ensure women’s 
representation in the DPR by issuing a gender quota for female lawmaker candidates. In the 
2009 general election, the regulation stipulates that political parties should ensure that their 
candidate lists include 30% women nominees.   
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Table 12: Laws and Regulations on Gender Equality in Indonesia 
Law Legal Stipulation 
Law 7/1984 on the Ratification of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)  
Article 2(b) stipulates that the state ‘shall make appropriate 
regulations and other measures, including suitable sanctions, to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.’  
Article 2(c) states that the state ‘shall provide legal protection of all 
women’s rights on the same basis as men’s rights, and ensure 
through a competent, national judicature system and other state 
agencies effective protection of women from all forms of 
discrimination.’ 
Law 39/1999 on Human Rights  Article 20(2) stipulates that slavery or slave trafficking, trafficking of 
women and all other type of actions with a similar purpose are 
prohibited by law.  
Article 48 states that women are entitled to education and teaching 
at all levels or types of education.  
Article 48 states that women have the right to choose jobs or 
professions. By law, they also have the right to legal protection from 
any threat that may affect their safety or health in their work or 
profession.   
Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on 
Gender Mainstreaming  
This instruction requires the mainstreaming of gender issues in state 
agencies and their programs.  
Source: Noerdin, 2006. 
 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that these laws and regulations cannot guarantee the elimination of 
gender inequality in all aspects of women’s lives, as their effects are very much dependent on 
their implementation. Furthermore, the extent to which programs consider gender inequality 
depends on the capacity of government officials as program implementers to integrate gender 
concerns. Gender awareness among state departments varies. Some departments show 
significant concern for gender issues in their programs, whereas many others appear to have 
no awareness of gender inequality or the potential gendered impacts of their programs. This 
results primarily from the influence of cultural norms or practices that belittle the role of 
women, and a lack of awareness of the importance of gender equality for effective program 
outcomes. A number of new laws to enhance gender equality often do not really matter in 
comparison with the embedded nature of cultural practices. Meanwhile, In order to 
implement gender equality awareness more effectively, another instrument is needed to 
oversee and ensure the process of translation of policy into actual programs. A number of key 
informants suggested that Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming is not 
effective on its own and needs supervision. Such a role should be played by the Ministry of 
Women’s Empowerment, but relatively limited capacity in the ministry is a key constraint. 
 
In social protection in particular, inclusion of gender perspectives has varied across different 
programs. Gender-specific vulnerabilities have been taken into consideration in the design of 
certain programs but neglected in others. This has been enforced primarily by donors, 
international organizations and NGOs. Under such circumstances, awareness may also be 
highly dependent on a program’s implementation. It may disappear with the termination of 
the program or its replacement by other programs. During the 1997/98 crisis period, for 
instance, gender components were included in social safety net programs, such as the 
provision of food supplements for children and pregnant/lactating mothers and the specific 
allocation of scholarship for female students. Unfortunately, these components disappeared 
with the replacement of social safety nets programs for the health and education sectors by 
Jamkesmas Health Insurance for the Poor program and BOS, respectively. 
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Among a number of government-implemented social protection programs, the integration of 
gender can be seen particularly in the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), which in 2007 
became the model for PNPM Mandiri as a national poverty reduction program, and the PKH 
conditional cash transfer program. The latter is modelled on conditional cash transfer 
programs in Latin America in terms of the way the allowance is transferred, specifically to 
women in the household. 
 
In KDP, specific attention is paid to women by taking affirmative action in favor of female 
villagers. In KDP Phase I, the program guidelines required that women be invited to village 
meetings or involved in decision-making. This requirement has been further enhanced in 
Phase II by establishing a specific meeting for women’s groups. The program also requires 
that, out of three projects implemented, one project should come from a women’s group. 
Finally, 25% of the budget should be allocated to microcredit for poor women. 
 
Meanwhile, unlike in the BLT unconditional cash transfer program, PKH guidelines state that 
that the allowance should be received by wives or adult female members of recipient 
households. Using such features, it is hoped that the program will increase women’s access to 
resources, which will result in increasing their position and allow them greater decision-
making in the household. 
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V. RASKIN PROGRAM POLICY AND DESIGN 
 
 
The Raskin program is an extension and refinement of the Special Market Program (OPK) that 
was put into place by the government in 1998 in an effort to deal with the impacts of the 1997/98 
financial crisis. OPK was part of the Social Security Net program, which involved increasing food 
security, job opportunities and incomes and access to basic services, particularly education and 
health (Suryahadi et al., 1999). In terms of increasing food security, through OPK the government 
provided 10kg of subsidised rice at the price of Rp 1,000 ($0.11) per kg1011 (at the same time the 
market price rice was Rp 2,500 ($0.28) per kg) for each target household to support household 
food consumption. Based on National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) data, the 
government determined that OPK would be targeted to 7.3 million households, or approximately 
15% of all Indonesian citizens (Rahayu et al., 1998). To improve on some weaknesses, particularly 
in order to refine targeting so that only poor households received the rice, the government then 
implemented a number of changes, including changing the name of the program to Raskin (Rice 
for Poor Households) (Suharyo and Rahayu, n.d). 
 
 
5.1 Design, Coverage, and Targeting  
 
In terms of design, in many ways the Raskin program does not differ greatly from OPK, in that it 
involves the distribution of subsidized rice to poor households. However, a number of aspects 
were added in order to improve on weaknesses, in terms of determining targets and program 
coverage. First, the amount of rice received by each household each month increased from 10kg 
to 20kg in 2002. Second, coverage was extended to include those grouped as Prosperous 
Households I program recipients. 11  In OPK, targets included only those grouped as Pre-
Prosperous Families. Third, as a result of the extension of coverage, the number of poor 
household program recipients increased quite significantly. In 2001, OPK covered 8.7 million 
poor households; in 2002, the number of Raskin recipients was at 9.8 million poor households. 
 
The Raskin implementation guidelines determine that, in order to ensure that subsidised rice is 
received only by poor households, BKKBN data need to be further studied in consultation 
with the village. This should include village government officials, local leaders, PKK officials, 
NGOs and other relevant parties. However, changes to the list of recipients can be carried out 
only within the already determined recipient quota framework (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). 
 
As the Raskin program developed, there were many changes in its implementation. The 
biggest change was in the determination of targets. In 2006, the government changed from 
using BKKBN community welfare classification data to using data on poor residents as 
released by BPS in 2006. Data on poor residents from BKKBN were considered to contain 
many weaknesses, in that they were not based on clear poverty criteria. For example in 
addition to the economic condition of households, BKKBN included the religious condition 
                                                 
10From October to November 1998, when OPK was being implemented, the price of medium-quality rice was 
approximately Rp 2,500 ($0.28). 
11Households can be classified by the BKKBN in terms or their well-being into five categories, according to their 
ability to meet all basic needs as well as secondary and tertiary needs, namely: Preprosperous; Prosperous 
Household I; Prosperous Household II; Prosperous Household III; and Prosperous Household III Plus. The 
more needs are met, the more prosperous the household is. A Preprosperous Household, for instance, cannot 
meet minimum basic needs. In contrast, a household under Prosperous Household I is able to meet minimum 
basic needs but unable to meet other social or psychological needs. This classification has been criticized for 
mixing economic indicators of well-being with noneconomic ones. 
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of a household as one of the criteria for determining the welfare level of residents. To 
improve on these weaknesses, the government, through BPS, conducted a survey on the 
socioeconomic condition of households in 2005 as a basis for arranging data on poor people 
in the country. Based on the results of this survey, it was determined that, in 2006, 10.8 million 
households should be Raskin program recipients. As seen in Table 13 below, the number is 
continually updated, and by 2007 had risen to 15.8 million poor households. This number 
increased to 18.8 million households in 2009 but then fell to 18.5 million households based on 
official poverty data in Indonesia.12 
 
Table 13. Number of Raskin-Recipient Households, 2002–2009 
Total HHs 
Year 
Total Poor HHsa Target HHs Target HHs as % of Total 
Allocation (Tonnes) 
2000  16,000,000 7,500,000 46.9 1,350,000 
2001  15,000,000 8,700,000 58.0 1,501,274 
2002  15,135,561 9,790,000 64.7 2,349,600 
2003  15,746,843 8,580,313 54.5 2,059,276 
2004  15,746,843 8,590,804 54.6 2,061,793 
2005  15,791,884 8,300,000 52.6 1,991,897 
2006  15,503,295 10,830,000 69.9 1,624,500 
2007  19,100,905 15,800,000 82.7 1,896,000 
aTo 2005, data for poor families came from the BKKBN; in 2006 and 2007, BPS data was used.  
Source: Hastuti et al., 2008.  
 
Another significant change is the fluctuation in the amount of rice received. When Raskin was 
first implemented in 2002, every recipient household received 20kg of rice per month. This 
was reduced to 15 kg per month in 2006 and 10 kg in 2007. After rising again to 15 kg per 
month in 2008, there is a plan for the allocation of rice per household to be reduced again to 
13 kg per month in 2010. Initially, the increase in the amount of subsidized rice per family was 
based on consideration of how much rice a poor household would need per month. With an 
average of four to five people in each household, it was estimated that the average amount of 
rice needed by each poor household would be 45 kg per month. Thus, the 10 kg of rice per 
month given as aid was considered too small to reduce the problems of the poor. Despite this, 
the total amount of rice to be distributed to each household each month was not clearly 
determined in the program’s implementation guidelines. In 2005, for example, the 
implementation guidelines stated only that each recipient household in the program would 
receive between 10 kg and 20 kg of rice per month (Hastuti et al., 2008). 
 
However, in practice, the total amount of rice received by poor households in many places is 
less than has been determined. The main reason for this is that the actual number of program 
recipients is more than the quota of Raskin recipients determined by the government. As 
Table 14 shows, the difference between the quota and the number of actual recipients 
(between 2002 and 2004, under Raskin) is between 26% and 38%. Research findings in 
various regions show that, to avoid social conflict, especially between the community and the 
village government, the rice is given to anyone who feels that they have the right to receive it. 
                                                 
12There is usually a time lag between official data on poverty and recipient targeting. The issue becomes more 
complex as the budget is allocated annually. Poverty data for 2008 are therefore based on the previous year’s 
survey. The same data are also used for calculating the budget. 
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Government targeting methods are not carried out at the village level. Changes to improve the 
accuracy of program targeting, that is, rice only for those who are poor, in the form of a 
consultation meeting at the village level, instead have become a legitimisation for the village 
government to distribute Raskin rice almost equally to all village residents. Some exceptions 
have arisen in certain villages where village governments have been able to overcome social 
pressure from residents (Olken et al., 2001). 
 
Table 14. Estimated Target and Realization of OPK and Raskin (2000-2004) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of poor families  15,000,000 14,782,000 15,135,561 15,746,843 
Quantity of disbursed rice (tons) 1,353,248 1,481,829 2,235,137 2,023,698 2,060,198 
Target (plan): 
• Targets (families)  7,500,000 8,700,000 9,790,000 8,580,313 8,590,804 
• Targets/poor families (%)   58 66 57 55 
• Rice quantity (kg/family/month)  15.0 14.2 19.0 19.7 20.0 
Realization:  
Beneficiaries (families)  10,934,861 8,316,185 12,333,923 11,832,897 11,664,050 
Beneficiaries/poor families (%)   55 83 78 74 
Beneficiaries/target (%)  146 96 126 138 136 
Rice quantity (kg/family/month)  10.3 14.8 15.1 14.3 14.7 
Source: Isdijoso and Rahayu (n.d). 
 
In our two research areas, Raskin rice is divided evenly, except in some specific cases in urban 
areas. In Timor Tengah Selatan, the head of the Sector II Regional Production Subdivision 
from the Regional Economic Sector Secretariat stated that, in some regions, Raskin rice is 
divided evenly among all village residents (male, interview, 6 November 2009). The heads of 
villages as implementers in the field said that, if the rice is not divided evenly, residents who 
do not receive it will not be willing to participate in village gotong royong (mutual assistance) 
activities (all male, interview, 11 November 2009). Thus, even distribution is carried out based 
on deliberations with village organizers and prominent community members. The head of the 
village in Sungai Tua stated that the Raskin rice in his village is allocated to only 276 
households but he distributes it to 470 (male, interview, 20 October 2009). In Tapanuli 
Tengah the situation is similar. The head of the village in Sawah Lama stated that almost all 
households in his village, that is, 239, receive Raskin rice, although the allocation is actually for 
only 118 households (male, interview, 14 October 2009). Exceptions are found in urban areas 
located close to the central government. One lurah (head of the kelurahan) 13  stated that, 
although there have been some implementation adjustments, the number of Raskin recipients 
has remained in line with the quota determined by the government (male, interview, 26 
October 2009). Strict control by the district government, the media, and NGOs has demand 
that the kelurahan government comply closely with program implementation guidelines.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13A kelurahan is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center. 
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5.2 How Gender Sensitive is the Raskin Program? 
 
Men and women have different food needs, to a certain extent. This is especially true for 
pregnant women and those who are breastfeeding, who require nutritious foods in addition to 
extra vitamins and other supplementary foods, not only for their own health but also for the 
baby they are carrying or the child they are feeding. Evidence shows that many poor women 
cannot fulfill this need. Children, meanwhile, who are still growing, also need extra 
nourishment. There are many cases of child malnutrition in Indonesia. 
 
However, these data are not always taken into consideration when food subsidy programs like 
Raskin are designed. Malnutrition is generally handled regionally, with interventions 
concentrated in certain areas where the number of children with malnutrition is high.14 
Certain households—those which receive the PKH—now pay more attention than previously 
to the food intake of their children and of pregnant or breastfeeding members of the 
household. However, of the 6.5 million very poor target households, only 720,000, spread 
over 13 provinces, have so far been reached. The government plans to implement the 
program until 2015, by which time the target of 6.5 million chronically poor households will 
have been reached (Hutagalung et al., 2009). Meanwhile, the specific needs of children and 
pregnant or breastfeeding women were not taken into account when Raskin, with a larger 
target number—18.5 million households all over Indonesia—was designed. The government 
argued that the program aimed primarily to help very poor households with food, so the main 
consideration was the amount of food, especially rice, provided.15 
 
In practice, the fact that little attention has been given to gender dimensions has led to a lack of 
attention to women’s concerns or the interests of certain groups of women, such as widows or 
female heads of households. Evidence shows that attention to these two groups of women is 
given on a personal basis, for example attention from the head of a village or his staff to the 
condition of an individual widow or female head of household. Attention is not given as part of a 
systemic effort to include gender-sensitive issues in program design. If the head of a village is not 
concerned, or if the living conditions of a widow do not require special attention, the head of the 
village will not pay special attention. This situation could have been avoided had the program 
explicitly regulated the need for gender mainstreaming in the program’s execution.  
 
With regard to public participation, the program guidelines suggest that the head of the village 
has the authority to call meetings to discuss and decide whether the program’s target list is 
appropriate. However, there is no effort to make sure that women have a say in village 
meetings. Interviews with key informants and discussions with villagers revealed that the 
meetings involve only village heads and village administration staff or some village leaders, 
most of whom are male. Although male villagers are usually not involved, their gendered 
needs and interests are represented by those who attend the meetings. In contrast, females 
have no way to voice their thoughts. They are present in meetings only as beneficiaries, as 
recipients of rice. Local tradition suggests that, since cooking is women’s responsibility, they 
are the ones who receive the Raskin rice. However, in terms of policymaking, they are not 
involved and not allowed to access decision-making processes.  
                                                 
14See, for example, interventions by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Food Program (WFP) in 
some areas in West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara. These programs take into account the fact that, in these 
areas, the rate of malnutrition is the highest and the poverty level is the worst compared with other areas. Another 
consideration is the limited amount of funds (interview with staff member of WFP, Jakarta, 2009). 
15If we consider the varying amount of rice given every year, it seems that the amount of funds available also has 
an effect on the program design. 
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VI. IMPACTS OF THE RASKIN PROGRAM AT INDIVIDUAL, 
HOUSEHOLD, AND COMMUNITY LEVELS 
 
 
This section highlights the impact of the Raskin program at individual, household, and 
community levels. 
 
 
6.1 Impacts at the Individual Level 
 
Households in Indonesia have strong communal identity. Many of our respondents emphasized 
that they collectively consume or do not consume foods. In the words of community members, 
‘ada sama dimakan, tidak ada sama ditahan’ (if they have food, all family members will eat. Otherwise, 
if they have no food, all of them must restrain themselves). For community members, the family 
entity cannot be reduced to it its individual members. When asked to point out who owns valuable 
resources, respondents always referred to the family as a single entity and not to certain individual 
members such as the father, mother or children. This also occurs in relation to consumption. 
When respondents were asked who receives more benefits from the Raskin program, their answer 
was that the whole family receives the benefits because all of them eat rice. 
 
Our qualitative information shows there is no systematic gender differentiation, in terms of 
cultural norms or social practices, between father and mother or boys and girls in terms of 
consumption patterns. On the other hand, our quantitative survey illustrates some individual-
level differences between children’s and adults’ and, to some extent, men’s and women’s 
consumption patterns. The most obvious difference is between adults and children. Some 
households reported that they give children more food. The reasons are that children are the 
most important members of the family, they are unable to cope with hunger and they are of 
school-going age so they need more nutritious food (they consider rice to be more nutritious 
than, for example, maize). However, when the children grow up, they are treated as other 
adult family members who have to eat the same type of staple food. 
 
Furthermore, interestingly, the survey shows that Raskin has different effects on every 
individual member of a family. When respondents were asked whether they reduce food 
consumption in a time of food shortage, almost all answered that they do, with the total 
percentage varying across four categories of household members. The highest percentage in 
Tapanuli Tengah was for female adults (mother/older sister) but in Timor Tengah Selatan it 
was for male adults; the lowest in both areas was for young girls. Boys are in between. Table 
15 shows a more detailed picture of this. Even though the data show more about reducing 
consumption, this also has a strong correlation with Raskin. Those household members who 
eat more will, presumably, consume more Raskin rice, and the opposite is also true. 
 
Table 15. Reduction of Food Consumption by Household Members during Food 
Shortages in Both Sites 
HH Member Categories Average (%) Tapanuli Tengah (%) Timor Tengah Selatan (%) 
Adult males  93.3 88.8 100 
Adult females  95.9 96.8 94.1 
Boys  79.4 81.4 75 
Girls  75.6 78.5 69.2 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
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From Table 15, it can be seen that, on average, adult women reduce their food intake the most 
when the household does not have enough food. According to respondents, a possible reason 
why adult females and not adult males reduce their food intake is that adult males are the 
breadwinners. Working to fulfill their responsibilities requires a great deal of energy, so they 
need to eat more. If we examine the details by region, in Timor Tengah Selatan more adult 
men stated that they are the ones who reduce their food intake if the family does not have 
enough food. This can be explained by the availability of various types of food besides rice 
and maize. When they experience food shortages, adult men can eat other foods, such as 
sweet potatoes, nuts and bananas. 
 
A qualitative explanation for the differences between girls and boys was not found, because 
differences given by informants and respondents referred more often to age. This means that, 
when there is a food shortage, generally all children, both boys and girls, are treated specially 
and food is given to them first. The data above show that the difference between boys and 
girls is not too significant. Any difference may be caused by traditional gender roles, according 
to which boys are considered stronger than girls so girls must be put first in obtaining the 
main staple food. 
 
As such, the biggest benefit of the Raskin program in terms of individual family members is 
gained by girls, followed by boys, adult males, and finally adult females. The benefit is an 
opportunity to eat the most rice when staple food stuffs are limited. Respondents in FGDs in 
Timor Tengah Selatan also considered that eating rice is better than eating maize and makes 
children smarter. However, it must be noted that only the FGDs in Timor Tengah Selatan 
underlined the prioritisation of children for rice from Raskin. Although beside the staple food 
there is maize, children are not yet able to consume this, as the texture is rough. In Tapanuli 
Tengah, rice is the main staple food for both children and adults. 
 
Our staple food is maize but the children do not want to eat it; they want rice 
because they have been eating rice since they were little. So if Raskin rice runs out, 
we look for money to buy rice to give to the children. (Male FGD, Ujung Atas, 
Timor Tengah Selatan 2009) 
By eating rice the children will be smarter but if we don’t have money they are forced 
to eat maize. (Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan 2009) 
Maize is our staple food so we eat maize. But small children, we give them rice, 
(Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan 2009) 
 
One more probable reason, other than cultural factors, why gender differences in food 
consumption are not so conspicuous in either the quantitative data or the qualitative 
information is related to the (lack of) severity of the food shortage. Based on the survey data, 
cases of food insecurity in both research sites are ‘not too bad,’ in the sense that the people 
never suffer from terrible famine. Such a situation may stop them from needing to formulate a 
coping mechanism that prioritizes certain family members over others based on gender 
considerations.  
 
As indicated in Table 16 below, 54% of respondents never experience food shortage at all; 8% 
experience food shortages once a week; 5% once a month; 13% once in two to four months; 
and 20% once in five months or more. There is only a slight difference between the two sites, 
except in incidence of food shortage once in five months (17% in Tapanuli Tengah (Table 17) 
and 24% in Timor Tengah Selatan (24%) (Table 18). This difference indicates that season has 
an influence on food security in both areas, with the latter worse off than the former. 
The SMERU Research Institute 37
Table 16. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Both Sites 
HH 
Members 
Never 
(%) 
Once a 
Week (%) 
Once a 
Month (%) 
Once in 2-4 
Months (%) 
Once in 5 
Months (%) 
Total 
(%) 
1–2  43 9 9 9 29 100 
3–5  58 6 4 15 17 100 
5–11  56 9 3 12 20 100 
Total   54 8 5 13 20 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey. 
 
Table 17. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah 
HH 
Members 
Never 
(%) 
Once a 
Week (%) 
Once a 
Month (%) 
Once in 2-4 
Months (%) 
Once in 5 
Months (%) 
Total 
(%) 
1–2  33 11 22 11 22 100 
3–5  57 5 5 14 19 100 
5–11  59 9 4 14 14 100 
Total   54 8 8 13 17 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey. 
 
Table 18. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan 
HH 
Members 
Never 
(%) 
Once a 
Week (%) 
Once a 
Month (%) 
Once in 2-4 
Months (%) 
Once in 5 
Months (%) 
Total 
(%) 
1–2  50 8 0 8 33 100 
3–5  59 7 4 15 15 100 
5–11  50 8 0 8 33 100 
Total   55 8 2 12 24 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey. 
 
To go deeper into the situation of food insecurity at the individual level, we also collected 
information on household meal frequency. In both areas, only about 16% of households eat 
twice a day, 3% eat twice plus snack and 1% eat irregularly; the rest, that is, 80%, eat three 
times a day. The number of household members contributes to food insecurity in the 
household. The more household members, the higher the possibility of a household eating 
fewer than three times a day, and vice versa.  
 
Table 19. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Both Sites 
Frequency of Eating per Day 
HH Members 
3 Times 2 Times Plus Snack 2 Times Irregular 
1–2  86 5 9 0 
3–5  85 4 11 0 
5–11  70 0 27 3 
Total  80 3 16 1 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
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Table 20. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah 
Frequency of Eating per Day 
HH Members 
3 Times 2 Times Plus Snack 2 Times Irregular 
1–2 78 0 22 0 
3–5 95 0 5 0 
5–11 67 0 28 5 
Total 80 0 18 2 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
Table 21. Household Members and Food Insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan 
Frequency of Eating per Day 
HH Members 
3 Times 2 Times Plus Snack 2 Times Irregular 
1–2  92 8 0 0 
3–5  78 7 15 0 
5–11  75 0 25 0 
Total   80 6 14 0 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
The tables above show a slight difference between Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah 
Selatan, in the sense that the severity of food shortage is higher in the former than in the latter. 
Even though the proportion of households that have three meals a day is the same (80%), the 
proportion of households that eat twice a day is higher in Tapanuli Tengah (18%) than in 
Timor Tengah Selatan (14%). Furthermore, if households in Timor Tengah Selatan usually eat 
regularly, in Tapanuli Tengah about 2% eat irregularly. However, it is worth noting that there 
are different traditions of consumption in the two sites. Households in Tapanuli Tengah eat 
rice as their sole staple food. In Timor Tengah Selatan, households usually have more variety. 
For breakfast, instead of rice or maize, adult family members eat potatoes, bananas or peanuts. 
For lunch they eat maize and for the dinner they eat rice. They always try to provide children 
with rice. The tradition of Timor Tengah Selatan households eating more than one sort of 
food makes them less vulnerable to food shortages than households in Tapanuli Tengah, 
which rely on one staple food. 
 
 
6.2 Impacts at the Household Level 
 
The effects of Raskin at the household level relate to the dynamics of the household economy. 
In order to determine these, we have to first understand the proportion families spend on rice 
alone compared with their total household spending, how many kilograms of rice they 
consume per month and how much Raskin contributes to their rice consumption. 
 
To begin with, it is interesting to note that household spending for food-related expenses is 
higher in Tapanuli Tengah than it is in Timor Tengah Selatan. As Table 22 shows, a large 
portion of poor households in Timor Tengah Selatan (39%) spend only 50% of their income 
on food-related expenses. In contrast, the largest portion of poor households in Tapanuli 
Tengah (63%) spends 80% of their income on food-related expenses. The reason for this 
difference is that people in Timor Tengah Selatan are more subsistent, allowing them lower 
food-related expenses than in Tapanuli Tengah. Since poor people in Timor Tengah Selatan 
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have farms that, to some extent, can sustain their daily consumption, they need less money 
than people in Tapanuli Tengah to buy food for daily consumption. 
 
Table 22. Proportion of Expenses Used for Food in Both Sites 
Expenses Used for Food/ 
Total Expenses (%) Tapanuli Tengah (%) Timor Tengah Selatan (%) Total (%) 
50 8 39 24 
60 4 4 4 
70 15 12 13 
80 63 29 45 
90 or more 10 16 13 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
Table 23. Rice Consumption per Month in Both Sites 
Variable Average Tapanuli Tengah Timor Tengah Selatan 
Rice consumption (kg/month) 37.6 51.4 23.5 
Raskin contribution (%)  35 22.3 48.6 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
In terms of rice consumption, there are variations across regions and households. These are 
determined to some extent by the importance of rice to household consumption (as the main 
or a secondary staple food), and also by the size of the household (the greater the number of 
household members, the more rice consumed). As mentioned, since rice is a secondary staple 
food in Timor Tengah Selatan, their need for rice is lower than in Tapanuli Tengah, where rice 
is the main staple. The average amount of rice consumed is 23.5 kg per month in Timor 
Tengah Selatan and 51.4 kg per month in Tapanuli Tengah. Average Raskin contribution to 
household rice consumption is about 35%. This varies according to the region, for the reasons 
mentioned above. Average contribution of Raskin in Tapanuli Tengah is 22.3% and in Timor 
Tengah Selatan it is 48.6%. Furthermore, in each site there are also variations in terms of 
respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which Raskin contributes to their rice consumption, 
ranging from zero to over 100%. A more complete picture of the variations is presented in 
Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Contribution of Raskin to Rice Consumption per Household in Both Sites  
Contribution (%)  Average (%) Tapanuli Tengah (%) Timor Tengah Selatan (%)  
0–25  48.5 75 21.5 
25–50  33 19.2 47 
50–75  11.6 3.8 19.6 
75–100  3.8 - 7.8 
>100  2.9 1.9 3.9 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
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Respondents and FGD participants stated that there are a number of benefits to receiving 
Raskin. The biggest benefit for their families is the help to the household economy. Before 
they received Raskin, they had to spend a lot of money buying rice; afterwards, they could 
save the difference in price between Raskin rice (Rp 1,600, or $0.17) and rice at the market 
(Rp 6,000-6,500, or $0.67-$0.72). If a household receives 30 kg of rice, the money they can 
save ranges from Rp 132,000-147,000 ($14.67-$16.33), which is a lot of money for poor 
people. As explained by FGD participants in Tapanuli Tengah, the money saved can be 
allocated to other needs, such as side dishes, children’s school needs, paying off debts, 
improving the quality of family consumption by purchasing more nutritious foods and so on. 
 
Happy of course. To buy four of those containers of rice is Rp 100,000 [$11.11]. Then 
comes Raskin, which is Rp 30,000-70,000 {$3.33-$7.78], where else can we get that? Of 
course we are happy.  (Male FGD, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)  
If there is Raskin we can save money, and the money can be used to buy side dishes. If there 
is no Raskin we cannot buy side dishes, only vegetables, so we don’t get to taste side dishes. 
(Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)  
There is [a benefit], we don’t have to buy rice. If we have this help we can pay off debts. 
(Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009)  
If when Raskin comes we are behind on our children’s school fees, we pay the school fees. 
School fees cannot go unpaid. Sometimes if it rains we cannot tap [the rubber trees], and we 
go into debt. Then after the harvest we pay. (Female FGD, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 
2009)  
When there is Raskin, I have some money left … so I pay some of my debt to the shop. 
(Female life history respondent, Muara Dua, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009) 
 
Interestingly, results of another SMERU study in progress17 stand out against this finding. 
This latter study shows that, when poor people receive aid in the form of a cash transfer, 
some of them use it to cover not only existing needs, such as paying off debts, fulfilling daily 
basic needs, etc, but also, and predominantly, ‘newly created’ needs, such as purchasing 
televisions, clothes, bicycles and livestock, repairing the house and so on, which were not 
covered by their low income. Even though they receive various transfers, the frequency of 
their debt is not significantly reduced.16 
 
Some families benefit greatly from Raskin at times when their incomes are insufficient, for 
example fishermen when there are storms or high tides and farmers when there is a long rainy 
season or a long dry season. In times like these, respondents felt that Raskin is very beneficial 
in terms of fulfilling their families’ food needs.   
 
So that’s our story, if we get it [income from fishing] once, we don’t get it twice. So luckily 
Raskin comes. Sometimes when there is Raskin, storms come, or there is a time of scarcity 
before the harvest. Like now. At the seafront now, everyone is suffering losses. It’s been 
three months. So we only just have enough to eat. Even those who get some, it’s not as 
much as we would have bought for one day. So actually Raskin really helps us, but the way 
of helping is not satisfactory. We haven’t even taken a breath, it’s already gone. So that’s how 
it is. (Male FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009) 
 
Another issue is that Raskin has not had any negative impact at all on households. 
Respondents asserted that the Raskin program has not caused any conflict within households, 
although it also has not reduced already existing potential for conflict. It seems that this is 
                                                 
16See Arif et al (2010) ‘Assessing the Roles of Women in the New Indonesia’s Conditional Cash Transfer 
Program,’ which study covers Cirebon and Kupang, and Timor Tengah Selatan. 
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because of the insignificant Raskin amounts, which cannot decrease the potential for 
household conflict, one of the largest of these being the lack of ability to fulfill household 
needs. Raskin was also considered not to have caused a reduction in family members’ 
participation in work, given that amounts are not significant enough to influence the whole 
household economy to reduce working hours or volume of work. Respondents made the 
following statements:  
 
[Incidents of fighting] are just the same ... No one actually hits, they only use words. Except 
for with children. (Female FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009) 
When would we have the time to count the money? The weekly shopping can’t even be 
done! There is no more spare money. Even though we work from 7 in the morning until 6 in 
the evening. (Female FGD, Sawah Lama, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009) 
For me there is no change. Because even if we have Raskin, there is no obstacle for me to 
work hard, I get money and put the rice aside, I cannot use the money because it is to cover 
other debts. That’s my chance to sometimes cover my debts. (Male FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli 
Tengah, 2009) 
 
 
6.3 Impacts at the Community Level 
  
According to respondents and key informants, the most visible impact of Raskin on the 
community is the emergence of jealousy between recipients and nonrecipients—not all 
recipients are very poor—some are actually middle class and some could even be categorized 
as rich. Because of a lack of clear criteria for receiving Raskin, all residents demanded to take 
part. Thus, in almost all villages, Raskin is divided evenly between all residents, both poor and 
rich. According to one village head, when Raskin rice is not divided equally, people who do 
not receive rice do not want to help in gotong royong activities, leaving this responsibility to 
those who receive Raskin. 
 
But people who have money got it. No [the village head did not inform how much rice 
should actually be received by each recipient household], the point is one sack per person, 
the rich, the poor, some of it wasn’t eaten but was sold … But some people who weren’t 
poor got it, whoever wants to. (Female FGD, Tapian, Tapanuli Tengah, 2009) 
Indeed, the village head gave it to everyone because the residents were being insistent. (Male 
FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009) 
Raskin is for heads of poor families but the village head’s and officials’ policy was to divide it 
evenly among everyone. Because when we work [gotong royong], those who don’t receive 
Raskin don’t come out and work. (Male FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009) 
 
An interesting fact in terms of mode of Raskin distribution is the difference between rural and 
urban villages. In rural villages, Raskin rice is distributed evenly among all citizens, regardless 
of their economic condition. In urban villages, rice is divided strictly among beneficiaries listed 
by BPS. In one village in Tapanuli Tengah, rice is not divided among all citizens, according to 
one informant, because the village is located near the district capital. The village worries that, 
if they give the rice to noneligible recipients, the district government, the media, and NGOs 
will find out and punish or report them. However, in one urban village in Timor Tengah 
Selatan, the rice is not divided among all inhabitants because from the beginning there was no 
such ‘deal’ between the headman and nonrecipients. Poor households consider the whole 
amount of rice (15 kg/month) their right and will share it with nobody. Nevertheless, social 
and political conditions at the village level should also be taken into account. The 
heterogeneity of an urban village, usually inhabited by various ethnic groups, contributes to 
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power relations and the power balance: no majority can impose its interests. Solidarity with 
regard to recipients sharing with nonrecipients is not going to work. 
 
Aside from the negative impact described above, no further negative impacts were found at 
community level. There was no evidence of an assumption that a program like Raskin 
encourages the formation of solidarity between poor groups. When asked why Raskin 
recipients do not put aside some of the rice they receive to go towards public interests at the 
village level, or forming a business group, male FGD participants in Sungai Tua, Timor 
Tengah Selatan, answered that they had not thought of these sorts of things. When it was 
explained that Raskin rice could be collected, for example one can per recipient, and used as 
capital to develop a village supply of rice in storage, one participant said, “We could, we’ll 
suggest it to the village head” (Male FGD, Sungai Tua, Timor Tengah Selatan, 2009).  
 
 
6.4 Perceptions of Raskin  
 
Generally, the Raskin program is considered beneficial for the community. Many survey 
respondents, approximately 40%, consider the program to have a very high level of benefits; 
25% consider that it has average benefits; 29% think it has low benefits; and about 7% believe 
it has no benefit at all. As Table 25 shows, there is quite a clear variation between the two 
sample districts. In Timor Tengah Selatan, the community satisfaction level tended to be high, 
whereas in Tapanuli Tengah the community tended to be less satisfied. This is probably 
caused by the different net benefits felt by recipients in the two regions owing to the different 
consumption patterns of the local communities, as explained previously.  
 
Table 25. Degree of Benefits of Raskin in Both Sites 
Benefits of Raskin  Timor Tengah Selatan (%) Tapanuli Tengah (%)  Total (%)  
Very high  51 28 40 
Average  25 24 25 
Low  24 34 29 
No impact  0 14 7 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
 
Going further, a number of effects were sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction for 
respondents in terms of Raskin. Many respondents (32%) felt that Raskin could increase 
consumption in their households, particularly of rice; 23% said that Raskin could reduce the 
expenditure burden on households; and around 18% considered that Raskin helps them pay 
off debts. Once again, differences can be seen in the two sample districts. In Timor Tengah 
Selatan, the majority of respondents (59%) felt that Raskin has helped them greatly increase 
household consumption and about 31% felt that Raskin could increase livelihood certainty. In 
Tapanuli Tengah, many respondents (38%) stated that Raskin is very helpful in reducing the 
burden on household expenditure and about 27% felt that Raskin makes it possible for them 
to pay off their debts (Table 26).  
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Table 26. Positive Impacts of Raskin in Both Sites 
Positive Impact of Raskin Timor Tengah Selatan (%) 
Tapanuli Tengah 
(%) Total (%) 
Increased certainty in terms of livelihood  31 4 18 
Increased household consumption  59 4 32 
Increased access to basic health services   2 1 
Increased access to basic education 
services   4 2 
Reduced household tension between men 
and women   2 1 
Reduced time poverty for women   4 2 
Other   2 1 
Can pay off debts   27 13 
Reduced household expenditure burden   8 38 23 
Help when the harvest fails/waiting for the 
harvest season  
 6 3 
Help during long rainy/hot seasons   2 6 4 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey. 
 
The different information between Timor Tengah Selatan and Tapanuli Tengah above can be 
understood by looking at the socioeconomic contexts of the regions. As explained previously, 
the characteristic of food insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah mostly reflects a lack of access to food 
sources—that is, they have to purchase rice. This means that rice is a very important 
component of household expenditure. Aside from that, their food insecurity is also related to 
the uncertain income and work of respondents. When they cannot go to sea, or they cannot 
tap rubber in the rainy season, they have no choice but to go into debt. The more frequently 
their income decreases, the bigger their debt. Thus, Raskin is very helpful to them because it 
reduces the expenditure burden and can also help them to pay off existing debts. 
 
In Timor Tengah Selatan, the subsistent way of living makes it possible for villagers to cope 
when there is no rice. They can still eat, even if this means relying on maize and other crops 
from their gardens. However, because many of them have children who cannot eat maize or 
cassava, they still have to buy rice. To do so, they need work. Having Raskin has greatly 
helped them increase consumption of rice in the household and also to ensure that their 
children can still eat rice at times when they cannot work to buy rice. 
 
There are also those who are unhappy with Raskin. Even those who are satisfied with the 
program feel there are some aspects of the program that are not satisfactory. The two sample 
regions have similar views in this regard. The biggest issue causing dissatisfaction among 
respondents is the amount of rice they receive. This is the main issue because, in reality, 
recipients do not get the amount of Raskin rice determined in the program’s design, which is 
15 kg per household per month. On average, respondents in the two regions receive only half 
of the rice promised, that is, about 7.5 kg. In almost all areas, the remainder is divided among 
nonrecipient residents. 
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Some respondents also thought that Raskin can help them only in the short term and not over 
time. Respondents stated that the rice is around for less than one week, although in Timor 
Tengah Selatan some respondents said that they benefit from Raskin for more than a month. 
Respondents were also unhappy with the difficult requirements: they have to pay Raskin 
money upfront and not in installments. In some villages in Timor Tengah Selatan, some 
respondents had to pay in full for the next distribution period in order to obtain the rice for 
the current period. 
 
Table 27. Negative Impacts of Raskin in Both Sites 
Negative Impact of Raskin Timor Tengah Selatan (%) 
Tapanuli Tengah 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Transfer does not satisfy  67 52 60 
Requirements take too long to fulfill  15 4 10 
Only beneficial in short term, no long-term or 
ongoing change  18 19 18 
Not flexible in terms of current household activities   7 3 
Creates conflict in the community   15 7 
Other   4 2 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from the household survey.  
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VII. DRIVERS OF PROGRAM IMPACTS 
 
 
This section highlights key issues that may affect the quality of program implementation in 
terms of both gender sensitivity and the implementation itself. Meanwhile, other than the 
program’s institutional arrangements, certain socioeconomic problems and geographical 
conditions appear to affect the differential benefits of Raskin for program recipients.   
 
 
7.1 Design and Institutional Structure 
 
With regard to the issue of gender in particular, there has been insufficient attention to 
differences between men and women in terms of ensuring food security. Policymakers in 
central government aimed the Raskin program at households and did not consider gender 
dimensions within the household.17 This may be a result of a lack of awareness of gender 
equality among many policymakers in the country. There is also a misconception that gender 
issues are related only to women performing better in their traditional tasks. Gender issues are 
viewed parochially, as having to do with women only, without considering the connection to 
the roles of men, let alone the balance of power relations between women and men. 
Consequently—as reflected in programs for women conducted by the New Order 
government through PKK, which is still in existence—programs that are supposed to 
empower women instead have emphasized their domestic role. The Raskin program does not 
have a negative impact on the role of women in the family or in society, but the absence of 
gender analysis in its design has meant that the different concerns of men and women in terms 
of access to food have been sidelined. In addition, the program has proven to be insensitive 
towards children, who are under the care of their mothers on a daily basis.  
 
The lack of gender awareness in the program’s design has been exacerbated by negligence with 
regard to women’s role in its institutional structure. Despite the involvement of various 
institutions, no gender focal point has been invited to participate, from national level to village 
level. At central level, implementation is under the control of the Central Raskin Coordinating 
Team, which includes various ministries and boards at central level, including the 
Coordinating Ministry for the Financial Sector, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the National 
Ministry for Planning and Development, Statistics Indonesia and the Logistics Board (Bulog). 
Bulog has the task of supplying and distributing rice to the region, but otherwise is parallel 
with other institutional members of the Central Raskin Coordinating Team, which is led by 
the secretary of the Coordinating Ministry for the People’s Welfare. This institutional structure 
is then replicated at lower government levels (province and kabupaten/kota). As at central level, 
these teams require coordination among agencies, that is, among institutions at provincial and 
district level, with the coordination implementer usually the Provincial and District 
Government Secretariat Office. 
 
In practical terms, the biggest workload seems to fall on the implementing institutions at the 
bottom level, including kecamatan and village governments. Bulog, as the rice supplier and 
distributor, is required to distribute the rice only to the distribution point, which is the 
kecamatan office. Bulog states that the funds available are not enough for it to be able to 
distribute rice to the village level. Thus, distribution beyond this point is handed over to 
kecamatan and village governments. In practice, the village government is the backbone of the 
program’s implementation because it is directly involved with recipient households and the 
                                                 
17Interviews with an official of the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, Jakarta, 5 November 2009. 
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community in general. It also has to face complaints or objections from those who are not 
satisfied and to take care of the administration of payments. In this, it has to collect payments 
from households that receive Raskin rice and send this to Bulog at central level. However, 
according to some heads of villages, there is no incentive to do this work. Institutions at 
higher levels consider this job part of their role as village officials. 
 
According to the implementation guidelines, district governments were to be asked to provide 
supplementary funds to support the implementation of the Raskin program. However, many 
kabupaten, including in the research sites, have not provided enough funds for these activities, 
meaning that there are no operational funds available at lower levels, that is, kecamatan and 
village levels. If funds are in fact available, they are often not transparent (Hastuti and Maxwell, 
2003). As a result, village governments have to seek out their own operational funds. As in 
other regions, the four villages in this study collect operational funds from recipient 
households, that is, by increasing the price of the rice from the central government standard 
price of Rp1,600 [$0.18] per kg to Rp2,000 [$0.22] per kg. The extra money is to be used for 
operational costs, especially to pay for the transportation of the rice from the center of the 
kecamatan to the villages. For villages that are located far away or that are hard to reach, the 
cost may be higher. Aside from paying for transportation fees, some heads of villages stated 
that some of the money is used to give a small amount of compensation to those who are 
involved in the distribution of rice in the village, especially those who transport it from the 
kecamatan center to distribution points in the villages. 
 
Within this kind of institutional structure, most of the responsibility for the implementation of 
the Raskin program is on the shoulders of the village government. The success or failure of 
the program in line with its objectives is very much determined by the role of the village. 
However, at the same time, because of close social relationships between village residents and 
heads, village heads cannot avoid social pressure from nonrecipient village residents who want 
to receive Raskin rice. These requests arise for a number of reasons. First, as indicated by 
program evaluations, there are still many residents in the lowest two income quintiles who do 
not receive Raskin rice. Second, some groups consider that Raskin rice is assistance from the 
government and thus that every citizen has the right to receive it. Because requests are often a 
product of sociopolitics at local level, such as political pressures on village heads, it is difficult 
for many heads to refuse them, so they divide the rice among more recipients than those listed 
as official recipients by the district government. 
 
Under such circumstances, in many villages targeting has to a degree been replaced by self-
selection. Those who consider themselves eligible to receive the subsidised rice take it when it 
is disbursed in their village, conditional on their having money to purchase it. Many poor 
households cannot actually buy the rice because they do not have enough money. In some 
places, availability of money itself is not a guarantee, as rice is usually given on the basis of 
‘first come first served.’ This could be because the rice is insufficient to distribute to all the 
people standing in line to buy it, or because people are still working in the fields when the rice 
is distributed. It can also be more difficult for old people or single parents, either male or 
female widows. Old people might find it difficult to compete with other people in queuing for 
the rice, and male or female widows might miss out on information about the distribution of 
the rice as they often have to work harder to support their children. Unfortunately, such issues 
are rarely taken into consideration by village leaders during consultation on Raskin distribution. 
Instead of prioritizing people in need, consultation is often carried out to provide legitimacy to 
the village government to distribute the rice to more villagers to reduce the social tension 
caused by the program’s implementation. However, in the view of poor people, this actually 
harms them as it reduces the amount of rice they receive.   
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7.2 Socioeconomic Conditions of Food Security of the Research Sites  
 
The magnitude of the benefits received by the program recipients is also influenced by the 
socioeconomic conditions as well as the geographical situation of the area in which they live. 
The two research sites, Tapanuli Tengah and Timor Tengah Selatan, have very different 
socioeconomic and geographical conditions, which end up affecting their food security. 
Whereas the main staple food of Tapanuli Tengah is rice, in Timor Tengah Selatan rice is the 
second main staple after maize. Thus, in Tapanuli Tengah more agricultural land for food 
crops is allocated to rice. In Timor Tengah Selatan, most agricultural land is planted with 
maize and none is now used for rice.18 
 
Second, compared with Timor Tengah Selatan, Tapanuli Tengah still has sufficient water, 
which makes it possible to harvest more than once a year. Only certain areas can be harvested 
only once. The land is also relatively fertile. In Timor Tengah Selatan, on the other hand, not 
one area can be harvested more than once because there is no access to water, except in the 
rainy season, which is only three or four months per year. The land is very dry and as hard as a 
rock, so it is difficult to plant young crops. These circumstances often have an impact on the 
size of the harvest that can be used for household food. 
 
Finally, poor residents in Tapanuli Tengah work mostly as laborers, plantation farmers or 
small-scale fishermen. This type of livelihood does not always guarantee a sufficient and 
constant income to support the family. In Timor Tengah Selatan, almost all the poor (about 
92%, compared with about 30% in Tapanuli Tengah) own their own land for farming. 
Nevertheless, they do not work on all of it, leaving approximately half of it uncultivated. The 
head of one village in Timor Tengah Selatan estimated that approximately 50% of the land in 
the village is not worked because the owners are unable to do so or because they are 
unenthusiastic. Part of the reason for this inability or lack of enthusiasm is the hardness and 
dryness of the land, which also has many rocks on the surface. In addition, some land is 
located in locations that are difficult to access. 
 
As such, it can be assumed that food insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah is caused mostly by limited 
access to food, resulting primarily from lack of ownership of rice fields and lack of sufficient 
income to provide food for the family. Production factors are not an issue in this region. The 
Tapanuli Tengah Agricultural Agency explained that the production of rice in the area is up to 
about 280,000 tons per year, and the size of the production area is about 28,000 hectares—1 
ha produces 9.8 tons per year. Thus, the government has given Tapanuli Tengah a ranking of 
only three (of six priority levels, one being the highest) in terms of food insecurity. 
 
In the case of Timor Tengah Selatan, it seems that food insecurity is caused mostly by 
production factors, that is, lack of productive or workable land available to produce food for 
the family. This is because the land is dry and there is very limited rainfall. Because natural 
factors are more dominant here, apart from other factors such as poverty, the government has 
ranked Timor Tengah Selatan as a number one priority on the national food security map. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18According to one life history respondent aged over 60 years old, before the 1960s, in some areas in Timor 
Tengah Selatan, including the two villages in the sample, a lot of land was planted with rice. At that time, every 
family owned its own rice fields so never had to buy rice. Later, rice plantations disappeared from the area, for 
reasons the respondent could not explain. 
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Looking at the information above, it is highly likely that the impact of the Raskin program on 
the two areas is different. Factors that determine the difference include: (i) the fact that food 
insecurity in Tapanuli Tengah is a problem of access (purchasing power), whereas in Timor 
Tengah Selatan food insecurity is a problem of availability (production factor); and (ii) the fact 
that for Tapanuli Tengah rice is the main staple food, whereas in Timor Tengah Selatan rice is 
the second main staple. Related to this second factor, the difference between the two can be 
seen in the total household rice consumption in each area. The quantitative data show that 
average household consumption of rice in Tapanuli Tengah is far higher than that in Timor 
Tengah Selatan, that is, 51.4 kg per month in Tapanuli Tengah and only 23.5 kg per month in 
Timor Tengah Selatan. 
 
Therefore, the contribution of Raskin, which provides the same amount of rice in all regions, 
that is, 15 kg per month per household, to food security for poor households in Timor 
Tengah Selatan is certainly bigger than that in Tapanuli Tengah.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
This study has shown that gender inequality faces women in Indonesia through various risks 
and vulnerabilities. These relate to the economic sphere but also permeate certain social 
practices and views, which belittle women’s role and put them in a more vulnerable position 
than men. 
 
In the economic sphere, sources of vulnerability include lack of employment opportunities, lack 
of adequate pay for female workers and violation of women’s rights at the workplace. As our 
research findings show, women receive lower wages than men, even for the same work. In the 
informal sector, in which most female workers have been concentrated since the last decade, 
women often have to work in marginal sectors such as domestic work or in high-risk jobs like 
sex work. In relation to food insecurity, it is most commonly women and children who suffer 
from malnutrition (Hadiprayitno, 2010): evidence indicates that, despite Indonesia’s growth 
during the most recent food and financial crises, child malnutrition cases have been rising. 
Among these cases, 28% of children are underweight and more than 44% are stunted. 
 
Women’s equal participation in economic and social development has also been hampered by 
certain social views and practices on gender issues and on the division of labor between men 
and women. These may cover household matters such as women’s domestic responsibilities, 
power relations between husbands and wives or public issues like women’s access to decision- 
making. Traditional cultural views and stereotypical labels on women pose another source of 
risk. In many areas, women’s inferior position has been worsened by violence and sexual abuse. 
 
Unfortunately, understandings of gender inequality have not been integrated effectively into 
social protection policy and programming in Indonesia, which has been very much influenced 
by the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. In this context, policy 
has been oriented to mitigate the adverse impacts of economic shocks on people’s well-being, 
without acknowledging the importance of addressing social inequalities, including gender 
inequalities. However, there are important exceptions, such as the education stipend for girls, 
women’s participation in community-led social protection activities and the recent PKH 
conditional cash transfer, which integrates gender considerations to some extent by targeting 
mothers or adult women in a family, targeting pregnant women and those with children under 
15 years and including antenatal and reproductive health care among the conditions with 
which beneficiaries need to comply. 
 
Our key informant interviews pointed to a number of reasons for this limited integration of 
gender across social protection policy and programming in the country. First, there is limited 
attention and commitment to gender equality issues at the policy level in terms of poverty 
reduction programming in general, which in part results from gaps in knowledge on gender 
and poverty (especially regional variations) and the relatively weak power and narrow mandate 
of the state Ministry of Women’s Empowerment at the national level. Although the ministry 
made contributory inputs into the 2004 Social Protection Law, its role since its passage has 
been minimal, mainly because its mandate is policy oriented and not operational. 
 
Second, people have limited knowledge on the links connecting the gendered dimensions of 
poverty and vulnerability with social protection programs. Furthermore, although there are 
strong women’s organisations working on gender issues, their focus is on broader issues, such 
as politics and democracy, and sector-specific issues, such as maternal mortality and migration, 
rather than on social protection. 
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Third, mainstreaming gender at national and subnational levels has to date faced many 
challenges. Our interviews suggested that, despite the availability of mainstreaming tools, the 
impact and visibility of gender remain a problem, partly because of weaknesses in the Ministry 
of Women’s Empowerment, limited funding for women’s organizations and an inability to 
change institutional incentives to better integrate gender concerns. Moreover, mainstreaming 
gender through the decentralization process at a time when decentralization itself is facing 
many demands as a relatively new governance structure has resulted in a loss of power, 
visibility and impact of gender mainstreaming instruments, such as gender budgeting. 
Previously, the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment’s structure went down to the lowest 
governance level, but now each region has its own policies. Gender mainstreaming seems not 
to be given due importance at local level, and there is a concern that local governments lack 
the capacity and priority to collect sex-disaggregated data for improved gender-sensitive policy 
and program design. 
 
With regard to the issue of food insecurity in particular, gender mainstreaming in the food 
subsidy program needs to consider the different dimensions of food insecurity facing women 
and men. Moreover, our study findings show that the sources of food insecurity may vary 
among regions depending on geographical conditions and the livelihoods of the poor. Poor 
people in Tapanuli Tengah suffer from lack of employment opportunities and income, thus 
lower purchasing power to buy food. Food insecurity in Timor Tengah Selatan is defined by 
the problems of food production, especially lack of fertile land, extreme seasonal changes and 
water unavailability during the dry season. The two regions also have different food staples – 
rice in Tapanuli Tengah and maize in Timor Tengah Selatan. In terms of food security, then, 
in Timor Tengah Selatan the pre-harvest period is likely to be the most difficult, as the 
previous year’s yields may have run out. This assessment does not include the threat of harvest 
failure. In Tapanuli Tengah, in contrast, difficulties in ensuring daily consumption may occur 
throughout the year depending on the price of rubber and the availability of side jobs to 
support a low income from rubber extraction. Some households often face food shortages 
during a year; a few experience food shortage every week. 
 
The impact of the Raskin program in the two research sites is very much influenced by the 
nature of food insecurity and people’s preferences regarding food consumption among 
household members. At an individual level, the benefits seem to be enjoyed more by younger 
people, as children are viewed as the most important members of the household and are more 
vulnerable to hunger than adults. In Timor Tengah Selatan in particular, the benefits are 
greater for children because the rice can replace maize as their main daily staple (rice is 
considered better than maize). At a household level, the Raskin program has generally 
improved the quantity as well as the quality of food intake, usually by enabling the provision 
of more side dishes. It has also had some side-effects in relation to easing households’ 
financial burden, especially with regard to paying for children’s education or settling 
household debts: as Raskin rice is much cheaper than the market price, recipients may have 
some extra money to meet other household expenditures. Finally, at the community level, the 
study found no impact of the program, either positive or negative. In the early years of its 
implementation, the program led to social tension and jealousy among villagers, especially 
between recipients and nonrecipients as well as between nonrecipients and the village 
administration. In many places, problems disappeared when the rice was distributed almost 
equally among all villagers. However, such an approach clearly reduces the benefits for eligible 
recipients, as they receive less than what they are technically allocated. 
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With regard to the gender dimensions of the impacts, findings in our research sites showed 
that Raskin rice is distributed relatively evenly between men and women in households. Adult 
women in Tapanuli Tengah reduce food consumption the most during food shortages, but it 
is adult men who do so in Timor Tengah Selatan. Villagers in Tapanuli Tengah explained that 
husbands are the ‘breadwinners’ so they may need more food than wives. In contrast, in 
Timor Tengah Selatan, villagers said that husbands or adult men reduce maize consumption 
because they eat other types of food besides maize. Instead of gender differences, it seems 
that age differences are more influential in defining people’s decision making over food intake 
during hard times: both quantitative and qualitative information reveals that villagers tend to 
prioritize children over adult household members, because they feel that children, both sons 
and daughters, are weaker and thus more vulnerable than adults. In this, girls reduce their 
consumption less than boys, possibly because of traditional cultural views that boys are 
generally stronger than girls. The side benefits of Raskin for children are higher if we also 
consider increased expenditure on children’s education, as mentioned above. 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the benefits of Raskin are shared equally between men and women 
does not necessarily indicate positive impacts of the program on gender equality. In the long 
term, Raskin may have positive impacts as its benefits help parents support the nutrition and 
education of boys and girls equally, but the program has no significant impacts on gender 
inequality, either economically or socially, especially in the perspective of wives. 
 
Even so, a number of entry points exist to strengthen the gender sensitivity of the program’s 
design and implementation, including promoting women’s participation in program governance 
structures (community meetings), strengthening the focus on existing gendered vulnerabilities in 
terms of food insecurity and under-nutrition and especially drawing attention to lifecycle 
vulnerabilities (pregnancy and nursing, young children). In addition, a number of opportunities at 
the policy level could be harnessed to support the integration of gender into social protection 
programs more broadly. The positive influence of donors is seen as important in supporting 
progress towards gender-sensitive social protection design features and updating the collection of 
sex-disaggregated data on poverty and vulnerability across the country. 
 
At the national level, gender legislation in Indonesia is very comprehensive (e.g., presidential 
decrees on gender mainstreaming), but limited political traction means that the translation of 
this framework into action is limited. The identification of allied ministries and agents of 
change in the government is therefore key. Bappenas – one of the most influential institutions 
in social protection – has been identified by the state Ministry of Women’s Empowerment as a 
potentially important ally in terms of gender responsiveness. The recent gender budgeting 
program strengthens gender budgeting in other ministries through the Ministry of Finance, to 
be completed by 2011. Finally, although decentralization presents many challenges, as 
discussed above, it also offers important opportunities in gender mainstreaming, including: 
increasing the number of women in political positions; improving the collection and analysis 
of gender-disaggregated data and statistics for better-informed policymaking; and laws to carry 
out district gender budgeting. 
 
At the program level, just as important is the need to recognise the limitations of Raskin as an 
effective tool for food security. Evidence clearly demonstrates that women’s vulnerability to 
poverty and food security needs to be addressed by measures such as securing women’s 
employment opportunities, addressing wage disparities to increase incomes and supporting 
agricultural production. In this way, there is a need to think strategically about the links 
between food subsidy programs and other programs which may have greater opportunities to 
support progress towards women’s empowerment. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Social Protection Programs in Indonesia 
Type of 
Social 
Protection 
Program Information Program Design Program Linkages Program Objectives 
Targeting/ 
Eligibility Coverage Result/Outcomes 
In-kind 
transfer (food 
subsidy). 
Includes 15kg 
of rice per 
month at 
subsidised 
price of Rp 
1,600 ($0.18) 
per kg (current 
market price is 
Rp 5,000 per 
kg, or $0.56).  
Raskin (Rice for Poor 
Households). The 
program has been in 
place since 1998 after 
the financial crisis hit 
the country in 1997. 
Initially, it was called 
the Special Market 
Program (OPK). In 
order to focus the 
targeting, the program 
was changed to 
Raskin in 2000. From 
the beginning, the 
program has been 
implemented by Bulog 
under the supervision 
of the Ministry of 
Social Welfare and 
funded by the central 
government.  
The amount of subsidy 
(15kg per month at 
subsidised price) was 
based on the average 
need of a household 
with 4-5 members. It 
targets households 
without specifying 
further whether actual 
recipients are male or 
female members of 
household. Usually, it 
is the husbands who 
are entitled to the 
program. But if the 
husband is busy at the 
time of rice 
disbursement, the wife 
may also take the rice.  
Raskin recipients 
usually also 
received 
Jamkesmas and 
BLT. Those 
categorized as 
chronic poor also 
receive PKH. Some 
of them also 
participate in 
employment 
creation or 
revolving credit 
programs (PNPM). 
Additionally, those 
with children at 
primary and 
secondary school 
also enjoy 
government 
subsidies in the 
education sector. 
To maintain 
food security 
of poor 
households, or 
keep their 
consumption 
level from 
falling below 
the poverty 
level. 
Since 2006, the 
government has 
used poverty data 
(PSE05 module) 
provided by the 
BPS. The program 
guidelines state that 
those below the 
poverty line and 
vulnerable to 
poverty are eligible 
for the program. 
Before 2006, 
targeting was 
based on National 
Family Planning 
data: those 
categorized as Pre-
Prosperous and 
Prosperous I were 
eligible. 
In 2009, the 
program covered 
18.5 million poor 
households, a 
slight decline from 
19.1 million in the 
previous year. 
Initially, OPK 
covered only 7.5 
and 8.7 million 
poor households in 
2000 and 2001, 
respectively. Later, 
it increased to 10.8 
and 15.8 million 
poor households in 
2006 and 2007, 
respectively.  
The program has helped 
poor households maintain 
their food security. It has 
also suffered from some 
weaknesses: leakage and 
undercoverage; the cost 
has been more expensive 
than stated because of 
additional transportation 
costs from distribution point 
to villages; the amount of 
rice is often less than the 
stated amount, as it is often 
distributed to more 
recipients. In some places, 
the rice is even distributed 
equally to all members of 
the community. Finally, its 
monitoring is not conducted 
properly and the program 
does not provide a 
complaint mechanism. 
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Type of 
Social 
Protection 
Program 
Information Program Design Program Linkages 
Program 
Objectives Targeting/Eligibility Coverage Result/Outcomes 
General 
subsidy for 
education. 
Recipients are 
schools, 
dependent on 
the number of 
students. In 
2009, the 
subsidy was 
about Rp 
297,000 ($33) 
and Rp 
570,000 
($63.33) per 
year for 
students of 
primary and 
junior high 
schools, 
respectively in 
rural areas, 
and Rp 
400,000 
($44.44) and 
Rp 575,000 
($63.89) in 
urban areas. 
BOS (School 
Operational 
Assistance). The 
program was 
developed from a 
previous one on social 
safety nets for the 
education sector, 
which consisted of 
scholarships for 
students from poor 
households and block 
grants for schools. In 
2005, the program 
changed to BOS, 
which allocates money 
to all students at 
primary and junior high 
(scholarships for senior 
high school students 
from poor households 
were maintained and 
the number slightly 
increased). Some of 
the money is meant to 
support poor students 
especially, but the 
amount is limited. 
From the outset, it has 
been maintained by 
the Ministry of 
Education and funded 
by the central 
government.  
The program provides 
primary and 
secondary schools 
with a certain amount 
of money to run 
teaching and other 
school activities. The 
program requires that 
schools receiving the 
grant do not take 
tuition fees from their 
students. Thus, all 
students, regardless 
of their sex or the 
welfare status of their 
parents, enjoy the 
benefits of the 
program. 
For those 
categorized as poor 
households, the 
government also 
provides a rice 
subsidy, health 
insurance and CCT 
in shock periods. 
Dependent on their 
eligibility, they may 
also have access to 
employment 
creation or revolving 
fund programs 
provided by PNPM. 
The chronic poor in 
particular may also 
receive PKH. 
To ease 
people's 
burden of 
paying school 
tuition fees for 
primary and 
junior high 
school and to 
help children 
complete 9 
years of 
compulsory 
basic 
education.  
No targeting as all 
primary and junior high 
schools may receive 
the grant conditional 
on their willingness to 
be audited. At the 
household level, all 
households who have 
primary and junior high 
school-age children 
may receive the 
benefits of the 
program regardless of 
their welfare status. 
Some additional 
benefits may be 
received by poor 
households as the 
program also provides 
specific allowances to 
support students from 
such households.  
The program 
covers 35.8 million 
primary and junior 
high school 
students. 
The program has helped 
schools maintain their 
operational costs and 
improve their services for 
students in terms of school 
facilities and extracurricular 
activities. It has also 
helped increase school 
participation by students 
from poor households and 
lower education costs in 
general. Some studies 
have found that the 
management of the fund is 
often not transparent 
because of the dominant 
role of school principals. 
Only a few schools provide 
a transportation allowance 
from BOS funds to 
students from poor 
households as required by 
the program 
implementation guideline.  
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Health 
insurance. This 
provides poor 
households 
with free health 
services and a 
referral system 
at public health 
centers and 
hospitals. 
Jamkesmas (Health 
Insurance for the 
Poor). The program 
has been 
implemented since 
2008. Previously, this 
government program 
for the health sector 
was implemented 
under a different 
scheme. Right after 
the 1997/98 crisis, the 
government 
implemented a social 
safety net for the 
health sector that 
provided subsidies for 
medical services, like 
medicine, and health 
cards for poor 
households for free 
health services. The 
program was later 
changed (to Askeskin) 
in 2005 and finally 
implemented as 
Jamkesmas. The 
program is managed 
by the Ministry of 
Health in cooperation 
with PT Askes and 
funded by the central 
government. 
The program provides 
health insurance for 
members of poor 
households. Every 
member of the 
household receives 
the insurance card 
regardless of their 
sex. The cards 
guarantee their right 
to have free basic 
health service at 
public health centers 
or public hospitals 
they are referred to.  
Recipients usually 
also receive a food 
subsidy (Raskin) 
and BLT. Those 
categorized as 
chronic poor also 
received PKH. 
Some may also 
have access to 
employment 
creation or revolving 
credit (PNPM). 
Those with children 
of primary and 
secondary school 
age also enjoy 
government 
subsidies in the 
education sector. 
To help poor 
households 
cover the 
costs of basic 
health services 
and referral 
schemes 
provided by 
public health 
centers or 
hospitals or 
midwives. 
Initially, under 
the social 
safety net 
model, the 
program also 
provided food 
supplements 
(e.g., vitamin 
tablets) for 
children and 
pregnant 
mothers from 
poor 
households.  
Individual targeting 
based on household 
welfare condition. 
Those categorized as 
poor (including 
chronic) and near 
poor are the targeted 
recipients. 
The coverage is 
76.4 million people. 
Disaggregated data 
is not available.   
SMERU studies found 
that health services by 
service providers, 
including quality of drugs, 
are of low quality. There 
is insufficient socialization 
of free health services for 
poor people and limited 
access by poor people to 
further medication in 
public hospitals. Other 
reports indicate problems 
in the disbursement of 
funds to public hospitals. 
Last but not least, 
different data on the 
number of poor people 
cause leakages and 
undercoverage.  
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Unconditional 
cash transfer. 
This provides 
Rp100,000 
($11.11) per 
month. The 
program is 
usually given 
for a one-year 
period, with 
the fund 
distributed 
quarterly.  
BLT (unconditional 
cash transfer). This is 
an unconditional 
transfer implemented 
only after an 
economic shock. The 
program has been 
implemented twice so 
far, once in 2005 after 
an increase in the 
price of fuel and once 
in 2008, for the same 
reason. Funded also 
by the central 
government, the 
program is 
implemented by the 
Ministry of Social 
Affairs in cooperation 
with the post office. 
The program is aimed 
at households. 
Nevertheless, it is 
husbands who usually 
receive the money. 
Based on traditional 
gender roles, the 
program defines the 
husband as the 
recipient of the 
program so it is their 
names that appear on 
the program card. 
However, if the 
husbands are busy at 
the time of 
disbursement, their 
wives are also allowed 
to collect the money, 
which is given in cash, 
in the post office close 
to their home. 
Recipients usually 
also receive the 
food subsidy 
(Raskin) and health 
insurance. Some 
who are categorized 
as chronic poor also 
receive PKH. Some 
also have access to 
employment 
creation or revolving 
credit programs 
(PNPM). Those with 
children at primary 
and secondary 
school also enjoy 
government 
subsidies in the 
education sector. 
Distributed 
after an 
economic 
shock, the 
program is 
meant to keep 
the welfare 
status of 
vulnerable 
households 
from falling 
into poverty, or 
poor 
households 
from falling 
further into 
poverty.  
Individual targeting 
based on household 
welfare condition. 
Those categorized as 
poor (including 
chronic) and near 
poor are the targeted 
recipients.  
The program covers 
18.5 million poor 
households. Initially, 
it covered only 15.5 
million in the first 
round. But because 
of complaints, and 
poverty data 
updating by BPS, 
the number of 
recipients was 
increased to 19.1 
million poor 
households in 2008. 
Studies have found that the 
program has helped the 
poor and vulnerable to 
mitigate the impacts of 
economic shocks by 
maintaining their household 
consumption level. The 
transfer is usually used for 
daily consumption, child 
education, health and other 
urgent household needs. 
Nevertheless, leakage and 
undercoverage were still 
found in many places. 
SMERU studies also found 
weak coordination among 
the program stakeholders 
and, in some cases, funds 
are distributed equally to all 
members of the 
community, which violates 
the purpose of the program. 
Conditional cash 
transfer. This 
provides chronic 
poor households 
with an 
allowance, 
ranging from Rp 
600,000 to Rp 
2,200,000 
($66.67-$244.44)
per year, 
dependent on 
the composition 
of the 
households, 
such as the 
number of 
children at junior 
high school.  
PKH (conditional 
cash transfer). The 
program has been in 
place since 2007 but 
is still being piloted in 
13 provinces. The 
program is managed 
by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
funded by the central 
government.  
The allowance is given 
on the condition that 
households take care 
of their children's 
health and education. 
Further, the program 
targets mothers or 
female members of the 
household on the 
assumption that it is 
mothers who usually 
take care of children's 
education and health. 
The allowance is gives 
every three months in 
cash; recipients should 
collect the money 
themselves in selected 
post offices. 
As PKH recipients 
are chronic poor, 
they also receive 
Raskin, BLT and 
health insurance 
programs. If they 
have children at 
primary and junior 
high school, they 
also receive the 
benefits of BOS. 
Furthermore, when 
available, they may 
also participate in 
employment 
creation programs 
that provide cash 
for work. 
To improve the 
quality of human 
development 
especially in 
chronic poor 
households, by 
providing an 
allowance for 
health and 
education 
maintenance. In 
the long term, 
the program 
aims at cutting 
the 
intergeneration 
transfer of 
poverty from 
parents to their 
children.  
Only those 
categorized as 
chronic poor and 
having children under 
five or primary and 
junior high school-age 
and/or pregnant 
mothers could access 
the program. 
By now, the 
program covers 
1.75 million chronic 
poor households.  
The program helps the 
chronic poor meet the cost 
of their children's education 
and health needs and the 
specific nutrition needs of 
young children and 
pregnant or breastfeeding 
mothers. Some of the funds 
are used to cover daily 
basic needs. Monitoring is 
not conducted properly and 
there is weak coordination 
between stakeholders. 
SMERU also found that 
some recipients do not 
meet requirements related 
to their children's school 
attendance or immunisation 
and regular weight checks. 
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Community 
empowerment. 
This provides a 
block grant to 
communities to 
build basic 
infrastructure. 
The amount of 
money ranges 
from Rp 1–3 
million 
($111.11-
$333.33), 
dependent on 
the population. 
For 2009, the 
total allocated 
amount was 
Rp16.1 trillion. 
PNPM Mandiri 
(National Program of 
Community 
Empowerment). 
Launched nationally 
in 2007, the program 
evolved from a 
number of others 
implemented since 
the 1990s: KDP, 
Urban Poverty 
Reduction Program 
(P2KP), Regional 
Infrastructure for 
Social and Economic 
Development 
(PISEW), Rural 
Infrastructure 
Development (PPIP) 
and Underdeveloped 
Area Development 
(P2DTK). It is 
conducted by several 
departments under 
coordination of the 
Ministry of Social 
Welfare and funded 
by the central 
government. 
Other than 
developing basic 
infrastructure for poor 
people, such as roads 
and clean water 
facilities, the program 
also aims at creating 
employment 
opportunities for poor 
people. About 20–
25% of the grant is 
meant to constitute a 
revolving fund (capital 
assistance) for 
members of the 
community. Women 
have better access to 
the revolving fund, 
but their participation 
in infrastructure 
development is often 
limited. This is 
because of a 
common perception 
that construction is 
men's work, not 
suitable for women 
Participants receive 
about Rp 40,000 
($4.44) per day. 
The program serves 
as an umbrella for 
all poverty reduction 
programs. It 
supports or 
complements direct 
social assistance or 
subsidies targeted 
at poor individuals.  
To accelerate 
poverty 
reduction as 
well as 
regional and 
infrastructure 
development.  
Initially, the program 
was meant to 
accelerate the 
development of 
underdeveloped 
areas. It used 
geographical 
targeting to choose 
area beneficiaries. 
The program has now 
been scaled up to 
cover more areas, but 
communities have to 
compete for the 
grants. At the 
community level, the 
opportunity to 
participate in public 
works is based on 
self-selection. 
The coverage of the 
program for 2009 
was 6,408 
kecamatan. It had 
increased 
significantly from 
2,361 kecamatan in 
2007 and 4,768 
kecamatan in 2008.  
In 2007, 67% of the grant 
was used to develop rural 
infrastructure, 17% for 
women’s microcredit 
facilities, 12% for 
education programs and 
4% for the health sector. 
In terms of employment 
creation, the program 
employed 14.4 million 
workers in 2008. It 
appeared that basic 
infrastructure developed 
by the program could 
improve people's 
economic activities. The 
unemployment rate in 
PNPM-recipient villages 
was 1.5 percent lower 
than that in non-PNPM 
recipient villages.  
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Microcredit. 
The program 
provides up to 
Rp 5million 
($555.56) for 
small 
entrepreneurs 
or more for 
bigger 
enterprises.  
KUR (People’s 
Business Credit). 
The program started 
in 2007 with the 
issuing of 
Presidential 
Instruction 6/2007. 
The program was 
inspired by the fact 
that small 
enterprises need 
capital assistance to 
run or develop their 
business.  
In order to implement 
the program, the 
government involved 
a number of 
commercial banks to 
channel credit to the 
recipients. The 
government also 
worked with 
microfinance 
institutions to broaden 
coverage.  
Poor people may 
also access some 
other government 
social protection 
programs including 
Raskin, BLT, and 
Jamkesmas. 
To accelerate 
the 
development of 
the real sector 
as well as small 
and micro 
enterprises. It 
also aims at 
anticipating the 
rise of 
unemployment 
as a result of 
the impacts of 
the global 
financial crisis.  
The program targets 
small enterprises.  
The program aimed 
to cover 2 million 
people in 2008 and 
another 4 million 
people in 2009.  
Not all enterprises can 
gain access to credit 
facilities because of 
difficulties in meeting the 
credit requirements. In 
the case of those 
receiving the loan, there 
is some that many have 
difficulties in paying the 
loan. 
Social 
insurance. The 
program 
insures against 
work 
accidents, 
illness, death, 
and funeral 
risks, but not 
unemployment. 
In the case of 
retirement, the 
program only 
gives a lump 
sum payment 
from a 
mandatory 
savings 
scheme paid 
by program 
participants, 
plus interest.  
Jamsostek (Social 
Insurance for 
Workers). Jamsostek 
has been in place 
since 1999. 
However, the origins 
of employees' social 
security can be 
traced back to the 
preindependence 
period. A step to 
reform the program 
was in 1977, with the 
establishment of 
Employees' 
Insurance, later 
modified into 
Jamsostek in 1999.  
Participation in the 
program is based on 
the premium paid by 
employees and their 
employers. It does 
not differentiate 
between male and 
female workers in 
program participation. 
Related to gender-
specific needs in 
particular, the 
program provides 
pregnancy and 
maternity care for 
female workers or 
employees' wives.  
Jamsostek is a 
contributory social 
security system. It 
has no formal 
linkages with other 
social protection 
systems.  
The objective 
of the program 
is to provide 
basic 
protection for 
employees 
and their 
families 
against 
socioeconomic 
risks that may 
affect them as 
a result of 
work-related 
accidents, 
illness, death, 
or old age. 
There is no 
specific 
gender 
objective in the 
program 
design.  
Until now, the 
program has targeted 
only employees of the 
formal sector. Some 
new initiatives are 
being taken by PT 
Jamsostek as the 
implementing agency 
to also target those in 
the informal sector.  
Coverage of the 
program is now still 
limited to the formal 
sector. The program 
covers 23.73 million 
employees (7.94 
million active 
workers and 15.79 
million nonactive 
workers).  
Since most of the labor 
force works in the 
informal sector (60-65%), 
the program covers only 
a small part of the 
economically active 
population. Female 
workers are often 
considered single 
regardless of their marital 
status: as they are 
usually not seen as the 
main income generator in 
the household, 
employers do not want to 
pay their contributions as 
married workers.    
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